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  INTRODUCTION   
In theory, criminal sentencing is a matter of justice, a 
question of public policy. Legislators, sentencing commissions, 
police, prosecutors, and judges are supposed to weigh an array 
of public values. In a democracy, voters naturally expect public 
servants to serve the public’s shared sense of justice. That 
sense reflects popular intuitions about retribution and expres-
sive condemnation tempered in some cases by the need to deter, 
incapacitate, reform, ensure fairness, and conserve resources.1
In practice, however, sentencing today looks very different 
from this ideal. For one thing, most judges’ sentences are large-
ly dictated by prosecutors’ plea bargains, which in turn reflect 
charging decisions and enforcement and arrest policies. That is 
doubly true in structured-sentencing jurisdictions, where sen-
tencing guidelines adopted by unelected commissions add yet 
another layer of constraint. Thus, sentencing judges often re-
semble figureheads, rubber-stamping faits accomplis rather 
 
That does not mean sentencing by opinion poll or mob rule; of 
course prosecutors and judges should use their expertise and 
try to filter out bias, vengefulness, and momentary passion. It 
means giving the public a view and a voice, but not a veto. 
Even though criminal justice experts should retain the upper 
hand, they should at least consider a range of facts, factors, and 
views. Public input not only informs the process, but also 
makes the system democratically legitimate. 
                                                                                 
 1. See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and 
Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
284, 288–97 (2002) (finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned 
punishments based on the seriousness of the crime and the existence of miti-
gating factors, but paid little attention to the chance of detection or the 
amount of publicity); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as 
Motives for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660–71, 676 (2000) 
(finding in empirical study that ordinary people assigned punishments based 
on the wrongfulness of and moral outrage at the crime, but weighed the dan-
ger of future crime only in limited circumstances). 
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than speaking in terms of deserved punishment or the broader 
aims of sentencing.  
A corollary is that dispositions are dictated by lawyers with 
little if any lay input or information. At sentencing, victims, de-
fendants, and community members may perhaps testify or 
submit letters describing the offenses and harms suffered. But 
that input comes far too late to receive meaningful considera-
tion because lawyers and other experts have already decided 
most factors determining sentence length before judges hear it. 
Criminal justice professionals, especially prosecutors, largely 
set sentences out of the public eye.  
Relying heavily on plea-bargained sentences makes sense 
only on the assumption that prosecutors, judges, police, and 
sentencing commissions fully stand in for the public in doing 
justice. That is in essence what the law of plea bargaining as-
sumes. Today, the American criminal justice system treats a 
plea bargain, including the sentence that it largely dictates, 
primarily as a private bargain between the prosecutor and the 
individual defendant. For decades, the Supreme Court has up-
held large sentence discounts and bargaining threats of far 
higher punishments by pointing to the “mutuality of ad-
vantage” that prosecutors and defendants reap by compromis-
ing.2 Leading scholars, most notably Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
endorse this view of “[p]lea [b]argaining as [c]ompromise” be-
cause just as “[s]ettlements of civil cases make both sides better 
off[,] settlements of criminal cases do so too.”3 Prosecutors (as 
well as police and judges) lighten their workloads and conserve 
time and resources for pursuing more cases, while defendants 
get lower sentences. And both sides purchase certainty of sen-
tences, minimizing risk.4
There is only one thing missing from this rosy mutuality of 
advantage: justice. Sentencing should not be about haggling 
over the market price of a sack of potatoes, but about doing jus-
tice. In a democracy, justice must heed public values and voic-
es. That is especially true of sentencing policy, which should 
balance an eclectic assortment of facts, factors, and competing 
 Viewed narrowly as a bilateral pri-
vate contract, a plea-bargained sentence leaves both prosecutor 
and defendant better off. 
                                                                                 
 2. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); accord 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
 3. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 
1969, 1969, 1975 (1992). 
 4. See id. 
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conceptions of the public good. The interests and views at stake 
are not limited to those of two partisans who bring their deal to 
the sentencing judge as a fait accompli. Those partisans may 
selectively present information and pursue private agendas 
that may diverge from those of the public at large. As prosecu-
tors are imperfect agents of the public interest, we cannot com-
placently trust plea bargaining to do justice.5
When regulating plea bargaining, courts look by analogy to 
private law, specifically contracts. But in modern criminal jus-
tice, with vastly overbroad criminal codes that offer prosecutors 
extensive menus of options, plea bargaining is the making of 
sentencing policy. In practice, it is prosecutors, not legislatures 
or judges, who resolve many of the complex debates about jus-
tice in sentencing. But they make those value-laden decisions 
out of sight, with little public input into or oversight of the 
tradeoffs involved. This gap between prosecutors, as agents, 
and the public, as the nominal principal whom they serve, 
leaves prosecutors free to pursue their own self-interests, en-
dangering the legitimacy of criminal justice and undercutting 
public confidence and respect. To solve these problems, we need 
to do more to ensure transparent and participatory processes 
for real-world, prosecutor-driven sentencing. That would give 
the public a voice, enhance legitimacy and oversight, and better 
balance the public’s eclectic demands in the scales of justice. 
Sentencing procedures should be open, fair, and accountable, 
not just fast and cheap.  
  
Public law, particularly administrative law, offers better 
models for soliciting an array of information and viewpoints 
that bear on the public interest in sentencing. Although calls 
for reforming plea bargaining are decades old, only a few schol-
ars have approached the issue from an administrative law per-
spective. Those who have done so have generally focused on the 
institutional design of prosecutors’ offices or more robust en-
forcement of separation of powers and other structural consti-
tutional norms.6
                                                                                 
 5. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2470–75 (2004). 
 The vast majority of plea-bargaining critiques 
 6. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) 
[hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design]; Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) [hereinafter 
Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System 
of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998); Ronald F. Wright, Sen-
tencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Screen-
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center on concerns that are internal to criminal justice, such as 
leniency, disparity, unjust outcomes, and defendants’ individu-
al rights. 
These concerns are important, and they partly drive our 
argument as well. But our public-law critique goes deeper, to 
the legitimacy and soundness of policymaking by plea with few 
meaningful opportunities for public input. We approach the 
problem from the angle of citizen input into sentencing itself. 
Modern administrative law views public participation as criti-
cal to limit agency discretion and ensure that agencies reflect 
and protect the public interest. It is thus worth exploring how 
administrative law might suggest reforms to make sentencing a 
more participatory and inclusive process. We might consider, 
then, notice-and-comment sentencing, by analogy to notice-and-
comment rulemaking. That framework could apply to a range 
of actors and decisions that influence sentencing, not only judg-
es’ imposition of sentences, but also prosecutors’ decisions to 
charge and plea bargain, sentencing commissions’ guidelines, 
and possibly police decisions to arrest. Much of this input 
would operate at the wholesale level (the level of formulating 
overarching policies). Some of it could even be tried at the retail 
level (the level of deciding individual cases), particularly in the 
most significant cases that merit the greatest public concern. 
Of course, the administrative law analogy is far from exact. 
Sentencing is a far more common event than administrative 
rulemaking and must necessarily move more swiftly. Prosecu-
tors prosecute and judges decide individual cases, while most 
agencies (except the NLRB) make rules of general applicability. 
But, particularly for more important crimes, sentences often 
reverberate beyond an individual case. Substantive policies 
both emerge from and drive patterns of individual arrests, 
charges, plea bargains, and sentences. Yet these patterns and 
policies may be hidden and substantively questionable. Even 
wholesale policies that are eventually made public suffer from 
too little public involvement in their formulation. Sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ing/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) [hereinafter Wright & 
Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff]; Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, 
The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1587 (2010) [hereinafter Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit]; see also 
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 188–207, 220–32 (1969) (sug-
gesting ways to limit and structure prosecutorial discretion and to subject it to 
judicial review); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981) (examining the nature and scope of prosecutorial 
discretion and proposing reforms for channeling discretion and enhancing ac-
countability). 
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guidelines, for instance, sometimes emerge from hidden delib-
erations of unrepresentative sentencing commissions that nei-
ther provide public notice nor solicit public comment. In partic-
ular, the Federal Guidelines never went through the notice-
and-comment process and have long been criticized as complex, 
unintelligible, and unjust. The same insularity and opacity in-
fects the prosecutorial decision-making that leads up to sen-
tencing. At both the wholesale and retail levels, there is little 
public input, little meaningful reason-giving to justify sentenc-
es, and only limited appellate review.  
Despite their dissimilarities, administrative law may have 
much to teach sentencing, including the arrest, charging, and 
plea-bargaining processes that cash out at sentencing. A more 
transparent, participatory process could create a feedback loop. 
Trends in retail decisions could improve wholesale and retail 
sentencing policy incrementally over time and flesh out in prac-
tice the meaning of fuzzy abstractions such as retribution. The 
right sentencing procedures could better blend expert and lay 
perspectives to offer competing views their day in court and il-
luminate prosecutors’ and judges’ sentencing decisions. And 
better sentencing procedures could promote statements of rea-
sons, appellate review, and consistency across cases. These re-
forms could improve post-trial sentencing as well. But they are 
especially needed in the many cases that would otherwise be 
resolved unilaterally by a prosecutor’s charging and plea-
bargaining decisions. 
Public participation could improve sentencing and its ante-
cedent processes in three distinct ways. First, it can illuminate 
the values at stake, shedding light on the composite public in-
terest. Information about values matters most in setting whole-
sale policies, but it might also matter interstitially at the retail 
level, in applying policies to atypical cases within a defined 
sentencing range. Second, public input can also bring im-
portant facts and data to light, subject to fact-finding proce-
dures and safeguards. And third, both wholesale and retail par-
ticipation carry expressive benefits, empowering citizens to air 
their views and take part in public policy debate. 
The remainder of this Article unfolds in four parts. Part I 
critiques the dominant treatment of the process leading up to 
sentencing, particularly plea bargaining, as mostly a bilateral 
private deal and explains the sentencing deficiencies that flow 
from that approach. Prosecutors need not explain or even have 
any charging policies, which allows charges to vary by prosecu-
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tor and by the desire to stack up plea-bargaining chips. In plea 
bargaining, prosecutors are free to threaten artificially high 
sentences or compromise on unduly low ones through a hidden 
process with little real oversight. The resulting charges and 
plea bargains largely dictate sentences. Judges usually rubber-
stamp these deals for a variety of reasons: sentencing laws and 
unelected sentencing commissions often tie judges’ hands; 
judges have little information beyond what the parties supply; 
and no one else offers contrary views, or those views arrive too 
late to matter. Judges may give sparse reasons for their sen-
tences, and those reasons are often subject to little appellate 
review, particularly because neither party will complain. The 
process largely shuts out information and perspectives provided 
by the public, victims, and other defendants. 
Part II explains how administrative law has long sought to 
address similar concerns. Often, broad governing statutes offer 
little substantive guidance, leaving agencies free to make 
countless value-laden choices in the name of the public interest. 
Early on, administrative law recognized the need to leaven 
agency policymaking with meaningful public input, backed up 
by explanations and judicial review. A variety of laws, includ-
ing the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment 
provisions,7
Part III considers how one could translate these adminis-
trative law principles into criminal cases to create something 
like notice-and-comment sentencing. At the wholesale level, 
public input would inform the drafting of policies on arrest, 
charging, and plea bargaining, as well as sentencing guidelines. 
At the retail level, judges would first have to give notice of pro-
posed sentences before accepting plea bargains, at least in the 
most visible, most serious cases. The notice could solicit a range 
of public input on everything from the harm to the victim and 
community, to the wrongfulness of the act and the blamewor-
thiness of the actor, to the need for deterrence, to the interests 
of third parties and society at large. The sentence would need 
 cabin agency discretion and foster legitimacy, ac-
countability, and substantively good outcomes by opening 
agency processes to public participation. While criminal sen-
tencing suffers from the same underlying structural and insti-
tutional concerns, criminal justice has not kept pace. A prime 
example is the U.S. Sentencing Commission: the opacity and 
insularity of its process is partly to blame for the failings of its 
much-hated Guidelines.  
                                                                                 
 7. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).  
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to take significant comments into account, include a reasoned 
decision responding to them, and be subject to appellate review 
that probes the sentencer’s reasoning. We envision a ladder of 
possible retail input, depending on one’s willingness to heed cit-
izens, victims, and community members. Public participation 
could be limited to providing factual information about the 
crime, the defendant, and the harms suffered. It could also il-
luminate the relevant sentencing factors. Or it might even ex-
tend to offering views and suggested outcomes, at least within 
ranges established by wholesale policies. Sentencing proce-
dures would let the parties contradict or respond to public 
comments before judges made retail findings. Because prosecu-
tors and defense counsel would not appeal their own bargains, 
one might also need to allow sua sponte appellate review or ap-
peals by probation officers or other stakeholders.  
Part IV responds to likely objections, including concerns 
about participation by a representative sample of the public, 
negative effects on law enforcement, and the cost and volume of 
cases. These are real concerns, but they are not insurmounta-
ble. This Article concludes that the right administrative proce-
dures and structures could blend popular input and expertise, 
checking agency costs and making sentencing more democrati-
cally legitimate, inclusive, and fair.  
I.  PLEA-BARGAINED SENTENCING: PRIVATE DEALS VS. 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST   
This Article’s overarching concern is with criminal sentenc-
ing. But today, the idea of a single, unitary moment of sentenc-
ing is by and large a myth. Real-world sentencing—what really 
determines sentences—has multiple stages. One of the most 
critical is plea bargaining. We start there, because it epitomizes 
the system’s insularity and opacity.  
A. THE STATUS QUO: PRIVATE DEALS 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed plea bargain-
ing as an efficient way to save time and money and further the 
parties’ preferences. As the Court recognized in Brady v. Unit-
ed States, plea bargains benefit both sides: defendants cap their 
sentencing exposure and get their cases over with, while prose-
cutors conserve resources to pursue other cases.8
                                                                                 
 8. 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
 Though the 
Court hinted that defendants who plead guilty are more ame-
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nable to rehabilitation and more quickly incapacitated, it fo-
cused on the “mutuality of advantage” accruing to both sides.9 
The Court believed the parties “arguably possess relatively 
equal bargaining power” and arrive at mutually beneficial 
deals through “give-and-take negotiation.”10 Competently ad-
vised defendants “are presumptively capable of intelligent 
choice.”11 Plea bargaining is “essential,” the Court has held, be-
cause otherwise the judiciary would need many more judges 
and courtrooms to handle prosecutors’ crushing workloads.12 
Thus, prosecutors may not only offer lower sentences, but also 
threaten heavier ones, in order to induce guilty pleas.13
The Court’s bargain model is consistent with its general 
deference to the parties’ preferences, even in criminal cases. 
The Court strongly presumes that most rules of evidence and 
criminal procedure can be waived as long as the waiver is 
knowing and voluntary and Congress has not expressly forbid-
den it.
 
14 That is true even of the constitutional rights to jury 
trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which defendants 
waive every day in pleading guilty.15 A defendant may even 
plead guilty while simultaneously protesting his innocence.16
Consistent with the Court’s focus on party autonomy, the 
main limitations on plea bargaining are analogous to the re-
quirements for a valid contract. A plea must be knowing and 
voluntary.
 
17 There are a few more safeguards than in contract 
law, including the right to counsel and the requirements of an 
adequate factual basis and a litany of waivers on the record.18
                                                                                 
 9. Id. at 752–53; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260–61 
(1971). 
 
But the main rule of law is that prosecutors must live up to 
their bargains. As in contract law, “when a plea rests in any 
 10. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (opinion of Brennan, J.)). 
 11. Id. at 363. 
 12. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260. 
 13. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363–65; Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–54. 
 14. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–02 (1995). 
 15. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (enumerating the rights waived during a 
federal guilty-plea colloquy). 
 16. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970). 
 17. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969).  
 18. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); see also Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 (emphasiz-
ing the presence of a “strong factual basis for the plea” when accepting de-
fendant’s guilty plea despite his simultaneous protestation of innocence); 
Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43 (holding that waiver of rights cannot be presumed 
from a silent record). 
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significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, 
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or considera-
tion, such promise must be fulfilled.”19 Thus, when enforcing 
plea bargains, courts borrow such contract-law doctrines as 
detrimental reliance and the rule of construing contracts contra 
proferentem.20 The main practical safeguard is that prosecutors 
and many defense counsel are repeat players who know the go-
ing rates and have reputational stakes in living up to their 
word.21
The federal and a majority of state systems forbid judges to 
participate in plea discussions, leaving bargained-for sentences 
up to the two parties.
  
22 Of course, judges remain free to reject 
plea agreements or to vary from the recommended sentence, 
except under stipulated-sentence plea agreements.23 But the 
plea-bargaining system presupposes that judges usually will 
accept bargains and hew close to the parties’ recommended sen-
tences. Presented with a fait accompli, and unfamiliar with the 
facts because there has been no trial, most judges do just that, 
rubber-stamping the bargain and sentence.24
                                                                                 
 19. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). 
 A bit more infor-
mation may emerge at sentencing, when victims may submit 
victim-impact statements and probation officers offer presen-
tence investigation reports. By then, however, the judge usually 
has accepted the plea bargain and so can do little to incorporate 
new information or perspectives. At most, the judge may con-
 20. Contra proferentem is the canon of construing ambiguities in contracts 
against the drafter. See, e.g., United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (summarizing cases applying contra proferentem canon to plea 
agreements); People v. Navarroli, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893–95 (Ill. 1998) (detri-
mental reliance); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (allowing 
parties to specify remedy for breach that operated in effect as waiver of dou-
ble-jeopardy right); Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509–10 (1984) (treating 
plea agreement as binding only when defendant pleads guilty in reliance on 
prosecutorial promise that the prosecution later breaches), abrogated on other 
grounds by Puckett v. United States 556 U.S. 129 (2009); Santobello, 404 U.S. 
at 262 (granting relief where defendant pleaded guilty in reliance on prosecu-
torial promise and prosecutor later breached that promise, albeit inadvertent-
ly). 
 21. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30 
(2012); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2480–81. 
 22. See MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: 
PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 390 (2d ed. 2005); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(c)(1). 
 23. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1), (3). 
 24. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY 
OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 131–34 (2003).  
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sider these factors in exercising discretion within the sentenc-
ing range left open by the bargain. 
The prosecutor’s charging decisions control that range to 
begin with. Judges can sentence defendants only for crimes to 
which they plead, and defendants can plead only to crimes with 
which they are charged. Charge bargains let prosecutors hem 
in judges’ freedom to deviate at sentencing by choosing from an 
extensive menu of charges and sentencing ranges provided by 
today’s modern criminal codes.25 In structured-sentencing ju-
risdictions, sentencing guidelines bolster that power, further 
constraining judges and allowing prosecutors to promise specif-
ic sentences more credibly.26 Charges thus become contract of-
fers, setting the terms of the bargain and nailing down the 
price of performance at sentencing. Prosecutors vary the offers 
by varying the charges. Judges, operating within a long tradi-
tion of strong deference to prosecutors, are reluctant to inter-
vene.27
Plea bargains, like private bargains, require almost no 
public justification. A prosecutor need not explain a plea bar-
gain at all, and a judge need do little to justify an agreed-upon 
sentence. In the minority of jurisdictions with sentencing 
guidelines, the judge may have to compute the offense level and 
recommended range and fill out a simple form. But, especially 
for a sentence within the recommended range, the judge need 
say little about his reasons for selecting a specific sentence.
  
28
                                                                                 
 25. See, e.g., David A. Starkweather, The Retributive Theory of “Just De-
serts” and Victim Participation in Plea Bargaining, 67 IND. L.J. 853, 872 
(1992). 
 
Thus, there is little justification or record to permit meaningful 
appellate review. Indeed, when the judge sentences in accord-
ance with the parties’ bargain, there probably will be no appel-
late review at all because neither side will appeal. Even if the 
parties are occasionally unhappy with the sentences on which 
they have agreed, plea bargains typically waive the right to ap-
 26. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics 
in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1304 (1997); Jeffrey 
Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
1471, 1505–17 (1993). 
 27. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 871–72. 
 28. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 356–59 (2007) (al-
lowing courts to presume within-Guidelines sentences reasonable, requiring 
less explanation for within-Guidelines sentences (particularly when the de-
fendant and prosecutor do not argue for a different sentence), and affirming a 
brief statement of reasons). 
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peal sentences, at least within the agreed-upon range.29 Victims 
and the public are not parties to criminal cases and cannot ap-
peal sentences.30
Academic defenders of plea bargaining, most notably Judge 
Frank Easterbrook, embrace the market analogy to contracts 
for particular sentences, including the charge bargaining that 
comes with it. Easterbrook candidly acknowledges that the con-
tract analogy fits awkwardly. The two sides are bilateral mo-
nopolists, and they bargain in the shadow of sentencing guide-
lines that operate as price controls, over a deal that makes one 
side worse off.
 
31 Nevertheless, plea bargains make sense, he ar-
gues. “[C]ompromise is better than conflict” because it allows 
defendants to cap their exposure and get their cases over with, 
while letting prosecutors leverage their resources to convict 
many more defendants and maximize deterrence.32 The re-
vealed preferences of defendants and prosecutors confirm that 
it must leave both sides better off.33
Another group of plea-bargaining proponents who are less 
enamored of the free market embrace the contract metaphor 
even as they seek to regulate it. Robert Scott and the late Bill 
Stuntz, for example, acknowledge “fundamental structural im-
pediments” that warp plea bargaining, but propose to mend it, 
not end it.
 
34 They nevertheless insist that “classical contract 
theory supports the freedom to bargain over criminal punish-
ment.”35
                                                                                 
 29. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Fu-
ture of Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 231, 243–44 (2005) (finding, in an 
empirical study of nearly one thousand defendants, that defendants waived 
their rights to appeal in nearly two-thirds of all plea-bargained cases and that 
most of those waivers applied to appealing sentences as well as convictions). 
 While perhaps defendants and the government should 
not be free to barter punishment, Scott and Stuntz believe that 
view would collide with “[t]he entire structure of the criminal 
 30. See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
760–61, 764 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that victims may appeal only if expressly 
authorized to do so by statute and that only Maryland and Utah authorize ap-
peals of denials of victims’ procedural rights, although several other states 
permit discretionary review of victims’-rights claims via the extraordinary 
writ of mandamus). 
 31. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1975. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 
J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983). 
 34. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 
YALE L.J. 1909, 1910–11 (1992). 
 35. Id. at 1910. 
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justice system” in America.36
B. MISSING: THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
 The private law of contracts is 
woven into the fabric of our law; a fundamentally public-law 
model is too radical for Scott and Stuntz to contemplate.  
The loose thread that unravels Easterbrook’s account is his 
identification of prosecutors with the public interest: “If de-
fendants and prosecutors (representing society) both gain, the 
process is desirable.”37 While prosecutors and defense lawyers 
suffer from agency costs, he dismisses that objection as “trivial” 
because “[a]gency costs are endemic” throughout life.38
Because prosecutorial discretion is standardless and 
opaque, prosecutors have great leeway to exploit the gap be-
tween their own interests and those of the public, and they fre-
quently do. Prosecutors may often view their job as maximizing 
convictions, but that is far from society’s only interest. Prosecu-
tors have self-interests in lightening their workloads and avoid-
ing embarrassing acquittals, so they are likely to be too risk-
averse about taking cases to trial and thus too pliable on sen-
tences.
 Easter-
brook’s casual equation of prosecutors with all of society’s mul-
tifarious interests is far too quick. It reduces justice to convic-
tions and reduces the criminal justice morality play to a hidden 
bargain. 
39 They may offer deeper discounts to aggressive or well-
connected defense counsel, especially in cases involving corpo-
rate or white-collar crime.40
                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 1917. 
 That pliability undermines racial 
and economic equality and can harm the diffuse public interest 
 37. Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 309. The public interest, we note, is a 
famously slippery concept, and we do not offer or defend a full normative ac-
count of that concept here. Our claim is more modest: however one defines the 
public interest, one must seek to accommodate, balance, and reflect the pub-
lic’s disparate and often conflicting values. Criminal justice, as currently ad-
ministered, has drifted too far from that ideal. 
 38. Id. at 309; Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 1975. 
 39. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2470–72. 
 40. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1729, 1745 (1993) (“The credible threat of an aggressive defense that will not 
necessarily lead to acquittal . . . may provide a bargaining chip sufficient to 
persuade an otherwise recalcitrant prosecutor to bargain in good faith.”); see 
also Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of 
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1330–31 (2001) (observing that 
“white-collar criminals are harder for the government to pursue because they 
can raise enforcement costs with vigorous legal defenses starting early in in-
vestigations”). 
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in vigorous enforcement.41 Prosecutors might also over-
regulate, quickly pleading out high volumes of low-level crimes 
while glossing over real questions of guilt or the serious collat-
eral consequences that might flow from such low-level pleas.42 
They are trained to put cases into legal and administrative pi-
geonholes, shutting out laymen’s broader concerns about equity 
and morality.43 In Josh Bowers’s evocative phrase, they “learn 
to think inside the proverbial legal box” without reflecting on 
how to exercise their discretion in line with the public’s sense of 
justice.44 They grow jaded by legal training and force of habit, 
so they come to lack outsiders’ fresh perspectives.45
Moreover, prosecutors appear to share Easterbrook’s fun-
damentally bottom-line approach. They behave as if their job is 
to maximize convictions and thus deterrence and incapacita-
tion. That view tends to slight less quantifiable substantive 
goals such as rehabilitation, retribution, and expressive con-
demnation, as well as softer values like reconciliation and for-
giveness. The rhetoric of justice, not just efficiency, matters. 
The bottom-line mentality also slights the process benefits of 
transparent, participatory procedures.
 
46
Historically, criminal justice was both transparent and 
participatory. Until about two centuries ago, lay litigants and 
juries took the lead in matters of crime and punishment, hear-
ing and deciding cases, assigning blame, and imposing sentenc-
es at public trials.
 Victims, defendants, 
and community members want their day in court. They want to 
know that the prosecutor has their best interests at heart. They 
want to see justice done, and they may want a voice in doing it. 
The mix of public values that goes into plea bargaining is com-
plex, and we cannot necessarily trust prosecutors to get it right 
on their own. 
47
                                                                                 
 41. See Bibas, supra note 
 Even after professional prosecutors dis-
placed pro se victims, prosecutors and judges lived in or near 
the neighborhoods they governed and were responsive to local 
communities’ needs, views, and senses of justice. That collective 
historical memory, embedded in the Bill of Rights’ jury-trial 
5, at 2477–86. 
 42. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 30, 32–33, 48–49.  
 43. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1689–92 (2010). 
 44. Id. at 1690. 
 45. BIBAS, supra note 21, at 32–33, 39–40. 
 46. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal 
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 922–23, 930–31 (2006). 
 47. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 1–9. 
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guarantees, still informs the public’s expectations and desire to 
see justice done. But these virtues are all but absent from to-
day’s sentencing hearings that rubber-stamp plea-bargained 
sentences. Plea bargaining occurs much earlier and out of 
sight. It excludes victims, community members, and other third 
parties from meaningful roles in illuminating the public inter-
ests at stake in sentencing.48
Partisan control also threatens the structural safeguards 
on criminal justice. An independent judiciary is supposed to 
pursue justice, ensure public confidence, and promote the de-
velopment of the law through precedent. It is supposed to check 
partisan prosecutors, who may be overzealous and overreach or 
serve their self-interests. To that end, witnesses and victims 
should offer their information and views, and probation officers 
should (and do) write up presentence investigation reports to 
inform sentencing judges. Sentencing judges are then supposed 
to offer reasons, and appellate courts can review those decisions 
and issue reasoned opinions that seek to ensure fair and con-
sistent sentencing policy across cases.  
  
The collusion endemic to plea bargaining subverts these 
structural safeguards, tying judges’ hands at sentencing. It 
risks letting prosecutors, unchecked by judges, vary sentence 
discounts for possibly arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. De-
fendants themselves provide almost no pushback, as they 
overwhelmingly prefer to avoid trial and more severe post-trial 
sentences. Defendants’ individual rights thus do little to check 
prosecutors, even when the exercise of those rights would clear-
ly serve the public interest.49 In addition, witnesses and victims 
who never testify cannot explain the harms defendants have 
caused or the punishments they might merit, and defendants’ 
families or affected communities cannot explain how the sen-
tencing policies at issue affect their own interests. When expla-
nations do come, they often arrive only after bargains have set-
tled matters. Parties sometimes limit or manipulate the 
sentencing information available, and judges often ignore 
presentence reports when they conflict with the parties’ bar-
gains.50
                                                                                 
 48. See id. at 1–6, 18–20, 29–40, 52. 
 Parties choose not to appeal and may waive their rights 
to do so. As a result, appellate review has little power to pre-
 49. See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1033–34. 
 50. See Francesca D. Bowman, Prob. Officers Advisory Grp. to the U.S. 
Sentencing Comm’n, Probation Officers Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 303, 305–06 (1996). 
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vent inequality, protect victims, or develop sentencing prece-
dents in typical cases.51
The opacity and insularity of prosecutorial policies exacer-
bate the problem. Bargained-for sentences often reverberate 
beyond the individual case, with substantive policies both 
emerging from and driving individual charging, bargaining, 
and sentencing.
 And it does little to assure that plea-
bargained sentencing adequately reflects and furthers public 
values. 
52 Yet these policies may often be hidden and 
substantively questionable. Some prosecutors’ offices have 
barebones charging and bargaining guidelines, if they have any 
at all.53 Others have more extensive but still informal policies, 
developed incrementally through office meetings, memoranda, 
and “a general process of osmosis.”54 Even those offices that 
have fairly detailed written guidelines rarely make them pub-
lic. And even those guidelines that are public are usually for-
mulated behind closed doors without public input.55
Lacking both wholesale- and retail-level input, the public 
has little way to probe plea bargaining’s value choices or to 
 
                                                                                 
 51. See Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics at Sentencing, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1371, 1394–95 (2009) (discussing how broad appeal waivers license 
collusion and threaten the development of precedent). 
 52. For a particularly salient example of non-party effects of retail sen-
tences, consider what some observers have dubbed a possible “Madoff effect” 
on recent white-collar sentences, involving a noticeable uptick in sentences of 
record-breaking severity since Bernard Madoff received a prison sentence of 
150 years after pleading guilty to arguably the largest individual financial 
crime in U.S. history. See Amir Efrati, Possible Madoff Effect: Triple-Digit 
White-Collar Prison Sentences, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010, 2:20 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/02/19/possible-madoff-effect-triple-digit-white-
collar-prison-sentences/ (describing three record-breaking white-collar sen-
tences handed down in the months following Madoff ’s sentencing and noting 
belief among many legal scholars that the Madoff sentence “likely empowered 
other judges to impose enormous, symbolic sentences for fraudsters”). 
 53. See, e.g., Thomas Michael McDonnell, Playing Beyond the Rules: A 
Realist and Rhetoric-Based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving Le-
gal Problems, 67 UMKC L. REV. 285, 301 n.86 (1998); Welsh S. White, A Pro-
posal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 442 
(1971); Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by 
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 900 (1964) (finding 
that forty-seven out of sixty-seven prosecutors questioned worked in offices 
without formal rules or procedures with respect to plea bargaining). 
 54. White, supra note 53, at 442. 
 55. See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, 
and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 443 (2001) (“Unless the pros-
ecutor alerts her constituents to policies and invites input, the public may re-
main uninformed. Prosecutors rarely publicize information on charging and 
plea bargaining policies on the ground that such openness would threaten law 
enforcement.”); McDonnell, supra note 53, at 301 n.86. 
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check their prosecutorial agents. They cannot question whether 
a lenient sentence for a first-time thief reflects a line prosecu-
tor’s personal mercy or an officewide policy of flushing petit lar-
ceny cases to rack up quick conviction statistics. They cannot 
know whether a stiff penalty for a juvenile mugger flows from a 
prosecutor’s own vindictiveness or a blanket refusal to charge 
bargain over violent crimes. And they cannot weigh in on the 
written and unwritten rules that drive plea bargaining. Those 
rules stretch from the moment of arrest, through charging 
thresholds, to diversion standards, to sentencing enhance-
ments, to prosecutorial resource allocation across cases. Prose-
cutors are free to craft those policies as they see fit, privileging 
their own interests and concerns over those of the public they 
supposedly serve.  
C. AN ILLUSTRATION  
The problems inherent in bargained-for sentences became 
apparent most recently in one of the rare cases to reject a bar-
gain. In October 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) sued Citigroup civilly for securities fraud, accusing 
it of misleading investors into investing in weak assets that 
Citigroup proceeded to bet against.56 On the same day that it 
filed its complaint, the SEC proposed and Citigroup consented 
to a civil settlement of the charges. Under the settlement, 
Citigroup would disgorge its profits on the deal plus interest, 
pay a $95 million penalty, agree to a permanent injunction, and 
adopt internal safeguards against securities fraud. As part of 
the settlement, Citigroup would neither admit nor deny the al-
legations.57 The SEC has long entered into such consent decrees 
without requiring any admission or denial of wrongdoing. That 
“long-standing policy [is] hallowed by history,” as judges usual-
ly go along with the SEC’s recommendations.58 Like many pros-
ecutors, the SEC justifies its practice by noting that settle-
ments allow the agency to pursue many more cases with its 
limited resources.59
                                                                                 
 56. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329–30 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 
 57. See id. at 330. 
 58. Id. at 332. 
 59. See, e.g., SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed 
by the Court Regarding Proposed Settlement at 12–13, SEC v. Citigroup Glob-
al Mkts. Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011) (citing SEC v. 
Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
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Judge Jed Rakoff rejected the settlement. His rejection was 
so extraordinary that it made the front page of the New York 
Times.60 Judge Rakoff noted that Citigroup was a recidivist, 
having been accused of and settled similar claims before.61 Yet 
the settlement would produce little deterrence or restitution 
given Citigroup’s size and profitability and the $700 million lost 
by investors.62 More importantly, the parties’ “narrow interests 
[in settling] . . . cannot be automatically equated with the pub-
lic interest, especially in the absence of a factual base on which 
to assess whether the resolution was fair, adequate, and rea-
sonable.”63 While courts must defer to the SEC’s expertise, they 
must independently satisfy themselves that settlements serve 
the public interest.64 Unless a trial establishes facts or the par-
ties admit them, judges lack a basis for evaluating settlements 
and deploying coercive power.65 And while the public has an 
“overriding public interest in knowing the truth,” settlements 
without facts “deprive[] [the public] of ever knowing the truth 
in a matter of obvious public importance.”66
Granted, Citigroup is a civil-fraud case and involves hun-
dreds of millions of dollars. But its concern for the judiciary’s 
independent role in safeguarding the public good applies at 
least as strongly to criminal cases. And the problem it illus-
trates is endemic to even the most mundane, low-level criminal 
matters.
 
67
                                                                                 
 60. See Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an S.E.C. Deal With Citigroup, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at A1. 
 Prosecuting agencies are imperfect guardians of the 
public interest, so judges must check them. The parties’ private 
interests in settling disputes do not exhaust the public’s inter-
est in airing all the facts, seeing justice done, and testing bar-
 61. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34. 
 62. See id. at 329, 333–34. 
 63. Id. at 335. 
 64. See id. at 330–32. 
 65. See id. at 332, 335. 
 66. Id. at 332, 335. 
 67. To be sure, unlike in the administrative penalty context, in all crimi-
nal cases, even the most mundane ones, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure and analogous state rules require a judge accepting a plea to 
find that it has an adequate factual basis. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.4(f ) nn. 21–22 (5th ed. 
2009) (discussing the factual basis requirement of Rule 11 and comparable 
state rules). In practice, however, that requirement does little to ensure either 
that the actual facts surrounding the crime are fully disclosed or that the 
prosecutor’s charging decision takes full and fair account of those facts. See 
infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.  
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gaining policies that may be “hallowed by history, but not by 
reason.”68
Yet the ruling is exceptional, almost unprecedented.
  
69 It is 
the rare judge who will stick his neck out and thwart a settle-
ment. Judges value settlements because they clear their dock-
ets expeditiously, and when the parties agree there is no one to 
complain, appeal, or offer a different point of view. For many 
years, judges have routinely acceded to securities settlements 
without requiring an admission of wrongdoing.70 Much the 
same happens in criminal cases, where defendants may hedge, 
take no position, or even openly deny guilt while reaping plea-
bargained sentences.71 Even when defendants grudgingly admit 
guilt as part of plea bargains, the parties may present only se-
lective and partial accounts rather than a full record of all the 
facts and views. And even when judges, sentencing guidelines, 
or statutes might call for a different sentence in light of a given 
bad act, prosecutors can still determine the effective sentence 
by deciding what crime to charge. The upshot, as Judge Gerard 
Lynch, Rachel Barkow, and others have explained, is that pros-
ecutors hold all the cards: they are the investigators, adjudica-
tors, and sentencers rolled into one, with tremendous power to 
shape sentencing policy in practice.72
The problem of plea bargaining, then, is not just one of dis-
parity, questionable convictions or acquittals, or unjust out-
comes. These are real problems, but they are symptoms of a 
structural flaw that leaves prosecutors and defendants free to 
pursue their own interests outside of the public eye. The prob-
lem, in short, is one of hidden and unaccountable policymaking 
by plea. 
  
                                                                                 
 68. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 331. 
 69. See Wyatt, supra note 60, at A1 (quoting former SEC chairman Har-
vey Pitt: “This is clearly a case of great significance . . . . It’s also a case for 
which there is no direct precedent.”). The Second Circuit has stayed the pro-
ceedings before Judge Rakoff, finding “that the S.E.C. and Citigroup have 
made a strong showing of likelihood of success in setting aside” Judge Rakoff ’s 
rejection of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 
169 (2012). Given that the SEC and Citigroup are united in opposition to 
Judge Rakoff ’s order, the court also appointed counsel to defend the order on 
appeal. Id. at 161. 
 70. See Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332. 
 71. See BIBAS, supra note 21, at 60–62. 
 72. See Lynch, supra note 6 at 2120; see also Barkow, Separation of Pow-
ers, supra note 6 at 1025.  
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II.  PARTICIPATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW   
Administrative law has long grappled with similar issues. 
Administrative agencies, like prosecutors, operate under mas-
sive statutory delegations of power. The agency personnel who 
implement those statutory charges make thousands of value-
laden decisions every day, from micro-level choices about 
whether to issue drilling permits to macro-level judgments 
about allowable levels of contaminants in drinking water. As in 
criminal law, those decisions greatly affect regulated parties, 
communities, and the general public. 
But unlike criminal law, administrative law has been built 
around ensuring that agencies make those decisions in the pub-
lic interest. A central concept is participation, the idea that cit-
izens should have some input into agency decisions. Public par-
ticipation, of course, is not the only way to check agency abuses. 
But it is a crucial way to ensure that agency decisions are legit-
imate, accountable, and just. 
There are many ways to ensure participation, ranging from 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements to common-
law principles that inform judicial review. They all seek to 
leaven agency decision-making with a healthy dose of public 
input, blending democracy with agency expertise and judicial 
oversight. And while the same legitimacy and accountability 
concerns that drive participation in administrative law also ex-
ist in criminal justice, criminal law has not kept pace. 
A. WHY PARTICIPATION MATTERS 
Before continuing, we should say more about what partici-
pation is and why it matters. Members of the public can partic-
ipate in governmental decision-making in many ways. One can 
vote for a president, a member of Congress, or one’s local prose-
cutor. Voting is abstract and general: it imperfectly communi-
cates the voter’s preferences on any given policy and does not 
involve the voter in the details of policymaking. At the other 
end of the spectrum are more direct modes of participation, in 
which citizens actually exercise governmental power. Examples 
include serving on a citizen licensing board or a criminal jury.73
                                                                                 
 73. See James D. Chesney, Citizen Participation on Regulatory Boards, 9 
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 125, 125–35 (1984); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not 
Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 475–80 (1992). 
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Both forms of participation are important, and we will re-
turn to each briefly later on.74 But the kind of participation we 
envision is somewhere in between. It involves letting citizens 
communicate their information and views, but leaves the gov-
ernmental decision-maker ultimate power to balance the vari-
ous inputs and make a final decision. In the process of reconcil-
ing these voices, the decision-maker mediates among various 
conceptions of the public good. This sort of participation has be-
come a cornerstone of modern administrative law. Indeed, as 
Ronald Wright and Marc Miller put it, “the history of adminis-
trative government in the United States can be framed as a 
story about combining expertise and public input.”75
Why does participation of this sort matter to administra-
tive law? It was not always this way. The Progressive reformers 
who put into place the broad institutional outlines of the mod-
ern regulatory state aimed to insulate administrative agencies 
from citizen involvement, not encourage it. At best, citizens 
were seen as incompetent in the affairs of government; at 
worst, they were suspect as corrupted instruments of majoritar-
ian politics.
  
76 Professional agency personnel, by contrast, were 
viewed as highly skilled technocrats who merely called upon 
their professional training to implement judgments that al-
ready had been made by Congress.77 New Dealers like James 
Landis took the notion further, famously maintaining that ad-
ministration was a science in which experts “bred to the facts” 
could ascertain and implement the objective public interest 
with only the most casual guidance from their organic stat-
utes.78
But as the federal government exploded in size and the au-
thority delegated to agencies mushroomed, the place of partici-
pation in the administrative state quickly changed. It soon be-
 
                                                                                 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 249–250, 287–293. 
 75. Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1591. 
 76. See Jasper Y. Brinton, Some Powers and Problems of the Federal Ad-
ministrative, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 135, 160–61 (1913) (discussing need for special 
training of administrative officials); Wright, supra note 73, at 495–96 (discuss-
ing Progressive concern that lay citizens could not serve competently or inde-
pendently). 
 77. See BENJAMIN P. DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 299–318 
(1915); MARTIN J. SCHIESL, THE POLITICS OF EFFICIENCY: MUNICIPAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION AND REFORM IN AMERICA: 1880–1920, at 6–25 (1977); RUSSELL 
STORY, THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL EXECUTIVE 218–20 (1918); Morris L. 
Cooke, Scientific Management of the Public Business, 9 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 488 
(1915). 
 78. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938). 
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came apparent that even the most expert agency personnel en-
gaged in the most seemingly technical of inquiries could not 
avoid making deeply discretionary, highly value-laden deci-
sions in the name of the public interest.79 One cannot, for in-
stance, determine the limit on parts per million of airborne 
benzene that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide 
safe or healthful employment” without confronting difficult 
tradeoffs of dollars versus lives or lives versus jobs; even “safe-
ty” is a fundamentally normative question that implicates una-
voidable value judgments.80 At the same time, scholars increas-
ingly recognized that agencies were not the enlightened 
Platonic guardians of the New Dealers’ vision. They were im-
perfectly attuned to the public interest, with their own prefer-
ences, agendas, incentives, and susceptibilities to capture by 
the very industries they were supposed to regulate. In other 
words, “the public interest is a texture of multiple strands”81 
and “not a monolith”;82 even if it were monolithic, we could not 
necessarily trust agencies to pursue it. Those realizations un-
dermined the notion of the impartial and just administrator 
and opened up a troubling legitimacy gap in the field.83 The 
project of administrative law quickly shifted from protecting 
agencies from citizen interference to closing that gap and struc-
turing agency discretion. Scholars now seek to “explain how 
unelected bureaucrats, making their choices without resort to a 
scientific method that produces a single correct answer, can 
claim to exercise legitimate power in a democracy.”84
                                                                                 
 79. See Richard B. Stewart, Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1676 (1975). 
  
 80. See Indust. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 
607, 615 (1980). 
 81. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). 
 82. Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 
81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972). 
 83. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2253–54 (2001) (tracing the rise of the regulatory state and the evolution 
of concerns about objectivity and legitimacy that accompanied it); Stewart, su-
pra note 79, at 1682–88 (discussing reduced faith in agencies’ ability to protect 
collective interests and the resulting need for new approaches to legitimating 
agency action and controlling agency discretion). 
 84. Wright, supra note 73, at 501 (citing CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGEN-
CIES 217 (1990)); see also William Funk, Public Participation and Transparen-
cy in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 171, 172–80 (2009) (discussing the history and legal and political context 
of the development of public participation as a cornerstone of modern Ameri-
can administrative law). 
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Participation has become embedded in modern administra-
tive law as critical to that project for several reasons. It en-
hances the soundness of agency decisions by improving the 
quality and variety of the information an agency considers, 
whether empirical or related to the public’s preferences.85 It 
improves accountability by obligating agencies to justify their 
actions publicly, ensuring that they are “relatively informed 
and responsive to public needs.”86 It increases public trust and 
educates citizens in government affairs, creating feedback loops 
between agencies and citizens.87 And, by requiring agencies to 
“balanc[e] all elements essential to a just determination of the 
public interest,” it bolsters agency decision-making’s democrat-
ic pedigree.88
Of course, how participation binds agents to the citizenry 
and promotes legitimacy will vary depending on one’s theory of 
how agencies work.
 
89 Neo-pluralist theorists view agency deci-
sions as legitimate because they let agencies aggregate the in-
formation and preferences of a wide variety of competing inter-
est groups.90
                                                                                 
 85. See Stewart, supra note 
 Civic republicans focus more on the intrinsically 
democratic nature of agency decision-making itself, seeing it as 
79, at 1748.  
 86. Misso Servs. Corp., v. Small Bus. Admin., No. 81-0283, 1981 WL 
30841, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981). 
 87. See HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH: A RETURN TO CITIZEN POLI-
TICS 131–33, 147–56 (1989); MARY G. KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLE-
MENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTIN-
GENCY APPROACH, 35–36, 84–96 (1981); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION 
AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22–44 (1970); John Ladd, The Ethics of Participa-
tion, in XVI NOMOS: PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS 98, 112–20 (J.R. Pennock & 
John R. Chapman eds., 1975); Hannah F. Pitkin, Justice: On Relating Private 
and Public, 9 POL. THEORY 327, 343, 348 (1981). 
 88. Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (“[T]he very legitimacy of general policymaking performed by unelected 
adminsitrators depends in no small part on the openness, accessibility, and 
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public.”); Palisades 
Citizens Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 420 F.2d 188, 191–92 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
 89. It also will vary to at least some degree depending on the specific con-
text, as the possibility of a gap between principal and agent interests, and the 
discounting of public values, will be more intense in some agency settings than 
in others. For an effort to sort out the times when external monitoring and 
public input will be most valuable as a supplement to agency expertise and 
professionalism, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the 
Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 589–95 (2011). 
 90. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Ad-
ministrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 57–60 (1998). 
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collective deliberation about competing regulatory values.91 
Public-interest theorists focus “on the general public’s ability to 
monitor regulatory decisionmakers.”92 Principal-agent theories 
take a different tack, seeking to locate agencies’ legitimacy in 
their responsiveness to democratically elected actors.93 Public-
choice theorists eschew legitimating agency regulation alto-
gether. Instead, they see it as suboptimal market decision-
making, in which agencies deliver regulatory “goods” to well-
organized political interest groups, which profit at the expense 
of the diffuse public.94
The differences among these theories are significant, and 
we do not mean to oversimplify. But our point is not to debate 
them here. As Nina Mendelson explains, virtually all of the ma-
jor theories that seek to legitimate administrative decision-
making see participation as important.
  
95 Neo-pluralists might 
see the opportunity to supply information and participate as 
crucial to aggregating interests effectively.96 Civic republicans 
might see it as necessary to ensure that agency deliberations 
“thoroughly engage relevant viewpoints.”97 Even presidential-
control proponents might see direct public involvement as a 
way to supply data and analyses and to monitor agencies’ com-
pliance with statutory mandates.98 And though confidence in 
interest representation has waned in recent decades, participa-
tory mechanisms remain a cornerstone of administrative law.99
                                                                                 
 91. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureau-
cratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992). 
  
 92. See Croley, supra note 90, at 5. 
 93. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 2273; Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory 
Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
418–20 (2007). 
 94. See Croley, supra note 90, at 5, 34–41. 
 95. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 419–20; see also Croley, supra note 
90, at 142–62 (reviewing extent to which administrative processes accord with 
various theories of regulation). 
 96. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 418. 
 97. See id. at 419. 
 98. See Kagan, supra note 83, at 2360; Mendelson, supra note 93, at 419. 
 99. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans 
Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
(SPECIAL EDITION) 5, 6 (2009) (observing that “[f ]or agency governance to be 
legitimate . . . administrative law must find ways to mediate [its] power,” and 
that one critical mechanism for doing so in American administrative law is 
through “fostering public participation in agency decision-making”); Wright & 
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1593 (“Current doctrines of ad-
ministrative law carve out special zones of influence for expertise and for pub-
lic input.”). 
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B. HOW PARTICIPATION WORKS 
1. Mechanisms of Participation 
The paradigmatic example of administrative law’s re-
quirement for public participation in agency policymaking is 
the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure. In informal rulemak-
ing, the APA requires an agency to provide the public with no-
tice and an opportunity to comment before its proposed rule fi-
nally takes effect.100 In practice, that applies whenever an 
agency seeks to lay down legally binding substantive obliga-
tions at the wholesale level. The notice, which is published in 
the Federal Register and on the federal government’s central 
rulemaking website,101 must adequately frame the issues so as 
to enable meaningful input by citizens: the agency must lay out 
both the terms or substance of the proposed rule and its basis, 
including its factual and scientific support.102 The comment pe-
riod stays open for a specified amount of time, often a few 
months. During that time, any interested members of the pub-
lic may submit their own “written data, views, or arguments” 
concerning the proposal.103 After considering the public’s com-
ments and making any changes, the agency publishes its final 
rule, again accompanied by a statement of its “basis and pur-
pose.”104 The statement of basis and purpose must explain 
“what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal 
proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.”105
                                                                                 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
 
The entire process, as the D.C. Circuit put it, is “designed (1) to 
ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to di-
verse public comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, 
and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity to develop evi-
 101. REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Sept. 6, 
2012).  
 102. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2006); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckel-
shaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.6a (5th ed. 2008).  
 103. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(h) (2012) (requiring mini-
mum of sixty-day comment period after FTC presiding officer places a recom-
mended decision in rulemaking record); 44 C.F.R. § 1.4(e) (2012) (FEMA policy 
to allow public sixty days for comment submission); 50 C.F.R. § 424.16(c)(2) 
(2012) (sixty-day comment period for proposed rules of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Department of the Interior and National Marine Fisheries Service, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and Department of Com-
merce relating to listing of endangered and threatened species).  
 104. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 105. Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 
1968). 
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dence in the record to support their objections to the rule and 
thereby enhance the quality of judicial review.”106
Broad standing rules enhance public input. The APA al-
lows any “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved” within 
the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judicial re-
view of agency action.
 
107 Courts interpret this language liberal-
ly to extend well beyond parties directly subject to an agency 
rule.108 They routinely allow trade groups, public interest 
groups, and others having an interest in the subject of a rule to 
challenge agency decisions.109 Challengers can contest the pro-
cedures used in promulgating the rule, by, for example, alleging 
lack of notice of the basis for a proposed rule.110 They can attack 
a rule’s substance, arguing, for instance, that it is arbitrary and 
capricious because it contravenes the weight of scientific evi-
dence.111 Or they can raise hybrid procedural-substantive chal-
lenges, such as attacking a rule as arbitrary and capricious for 
failing to respond to a major objection raised in comments.112
Other general statutory provisions bolster participation as 
well. The Negotiated Rulemaking Act encourages agencies to 
work closely with affected stakeholders to reach consensus on 
proposed rules before the agencies issue them.
 
113 The Act per-
mits an agency to convene a committee of interested persons 
and organizations, some of whom the agency invites and others 
who apply after public notice, to address a specific problem in 
need of a rule.114 The committee then works with a facilitator, 
who keeps a record of the proceedings, to reach consensus on 
the substance of the rule.115
                                                                                 
 106. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health 
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 Successful negotiations result in a 
proposed rule; unsuccessful negotiations at least result in some 
 107. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). 
 108. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 
154 (1970). 
 109. See id. at 155.  
 110. See United States v. N. S. Food Prod. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 
1977); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
 111. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Au-
to. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52–54 (1983). 
 112. See cases cited infra note 126. 
 113. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570a (2006); PIERCE 
ET AL., supra note 102, § 6.4.6f, at 342–43 (describing negotiated rulemaking). 
 114. 5 U.S.C. § 564 (2006). 
 115. See id. § 566(d). 
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pre-proposal airing of what the issues are.116 The Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act 
similarly seek to ensure that meetings and consultations with 
private interests on matters of agency policy are known and 
open to the public.117
Organic statutes and agency practices provide for similar 
consultation in more specific contexts, such as long-range plan-
ning programs involving public land management and trans-
portation.
 
118 The Environmental Protection Agency, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, and other agencies 
use risk-ranking, willingness-to-pay, and similar surveys to de-
termine public preferences and values regarding harms to life, 
health, or the environment.119 A number of agencies, such as 
the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OHSA), also adopt public enforcement memoranda to guide 
and explain their enforcement decisions, and they periodically 
revise those policies in response to public concerns.120
                                                                                 
 116. See generally NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (David M. 
Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 2d ed. 1995) (describing processes and 
communications from a number of successful and unsuccessful negotiated 
rulemakings).  
 
 117. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2 (2006); Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006). The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act also grants members of the public widespread access to agency in-
formation, enhancing citizens’ ability to make participation effective. See 5 
U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
 118. See, e.g., Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1612 (2006) (providing that the Secretary of Agriculture shall estab-
lish procedures to give the public adequate notice and an opportunity to com-
ment on the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to 
Forest Service programs). 
 119. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECO-
LOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES: A REPORT OF THE EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY 
BOARD 44–45 (2009), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
F3DB1F5C6EF90EE1852575C500589157/$File/EPA-SAB-9-012-unsigned.pdf (de-
scribing survey methods used in valuing ecosystem services); Baruch 
Fischhoff, Ranking Risks, 6 RISK 191, 196–97 (1995) (describing EPA’s use of 
state and local risk-ranking exercises to aid in priority determinations); see 
also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regu-
lation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1508 & n.115 (2001) (discussing the Health 
Services Commission’s use of public quality-of-life ratings in determining pri-
ority condition-treatment lists). 
 120. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2011-1, 2011-1 C.B. 259, available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-01.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GUID-
ANCE TO ICE ATTORNEYS REVIEWING THE CBP, USCIS, AND ICE CASES BE-
FORE THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW (2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/guidance-to-ice-
attorneys-reviewing-cbp-uscis-ice-cases-before-eoir.pdf; OCCUPATIONAL SAFE-
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Like the APA’s notice-and-comment procedure itself, many 
of these mechanisms apply primarily to agency actions taken at 
the wholesale, or rulemaking, level—the equivalent of a sen-
tencing commission’s creation of binding sentencing guidelines. 
Individual sentencing determinations, by contrast, are more 
like adjudications. But even at the retail level of individual 
agency adjudications, public input is important, if less systema-
tized. Some agencies, like the FCC, allow interested parties 
wide latitude to intervene in formal adjudications.121 Others, 
like the NLRB, let interested parties submit views and data via 
amicus briefs.122
Where civil penalties or consent decrees are at issue in 
agency enforcement actions, some statutes and regulations re-
quire soliciting and considering public comments.
 
123 A few, like 
the Tunney Act, go even further. It requires the Department of 
Justice to give public notice of civil consent judgments entered 
under U.S. antitrust laws, provide a sixty-day comment period, 
and publish both the comments and its own written response in 
the Federal Register.124 The district court must find that the 
consent judgment is in fact in the public interest before enter-
ing it and may consider the public’s comments in making that 
determination.125
                                                                                                                                                                             
TY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OSHA’S FIELD OPERATIONS 
MANUAL (FOM) (2009), available at http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_
pdf/CPL_02-00-148.pdf. Many agencies adopt similar practices for a variety of 
informal and non-binding guidance documents. See Mendelson, supra note 
  
93, 
at 424–27; see also Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and 
Budget, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies 13–18 (Jan. 18, 
2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-
07.pdf (requiring agencies to gather and accept public comments for “signifi-
cant” guidance documents, but generally not requiring them to offer a public 
response). 
 121. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (2012). 
 122. See BRENT GARREN ET AL., HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NLRB 
207 (7th ed. 2000); see generally PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, §§ 5.5–5.5.4, at 
171–81 (surveying agency intervention rules). 
 123. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(4) (2006); FTC Regulations, 16 C.F.R. 
§§ 2.34(c)–(e) (2012); Consumer Product Safety Commission Regulations, 16 
C.F.R. §§ 1118.20(e)–(g) (2012); see also Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(g) (2006); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (2012) (adopting procedures for 
public comment on proposed consent judgments under CERCLA).  
 124. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)–(d) (2006). 
 125. See id. §§ 16(e), (f )(4) (2006).  
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2. Participation, Explanation, and Judicial Review 
Opportunities to participate would be worth little if agen-
cies could ignore public comments at will, with no explanation 
or oversight. Administrative law gives teeth to participation by 
requiring robust explanations and judicial review. Agencies 
conducting informal rulemakings, for example, must respond to 
significant public comments on the record, particularly those 
that criticize the agency’s position or provide new, pertinent in-
formation.126 In informal adjudications, statutes do not formally 
require agencies to respond to comments. Even there, however, 
agencies cannot act “arbitrar[ily] and capricious[ly]” or ignore 
significant information or arguments provided by intervenors 
or other commenters.127
Courts take a “hard look” at agency action to enforce that 
principle, probing the record and agencies’ reasoning to ensure 
that their decisions are not arbitrary, have some basis in fact, 
and comply with their organic statutes.
 In all cases, agencies must base their 
decisions on the information before them and must adequately 
explain their choices.  
128 That means that 
agencies must justify refusals to embrace obvious alternatives, 
such as the choice of one route over another in building a high-
way through a park.129 They must explain how they are treating 
like cases alike and different cases differently, such as why one 
refusal to bargain with a group of faculty at one university con-
stitutes an unfair labor practice while another does not.130 And 
they must give reasons for changing course from past positions, 
such as denying waivers of deportation to aliens who fraudu-
lently enter the country after having allowed such waivers for 
years.131
                                                                                 
 126. See, e.g., PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. FERC, 419 F.3d 1194, 1198–
99 (D.C. Cir. 2005); La. Fed. Land Bank Ass’n, FLCA v. Farm Credit Admin., 
336 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 In short, in implementing their visions of the public in-
 127. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).  
 128. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, § 7.5, at 391–403 (describing the 
hard-look doctrine). 
 129. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413–20; see also Mo-
tor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may 
change, either with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency 
changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis.” (quoting Greater Bos. 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
 130. See Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 131. See INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996). 
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terest, agencies must explain and justify each exercise of their 
discretion. 
Public input and judicial review do not give either courts or 
the public the final say. Agency decisions are still agency deci-
sions. It is a time-honored principle of administrative law that, 
in reviewing agency actions, courts will not substitute their 
own vision of the public good for that of the agency.132 Judges 
must give great deference to agency judgments, particularly 
where they are “the product of administrative experience, ap-
preciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the 
statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested 
facts.”133 Agencies have the primary role in shaping their sub-
stantive agenda, as exemplified by Chevron’s famous instruc-
tion that courts must defer to agencies’ reasonable interpreta-
tions of their organic statutes whenever Congress has not 
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”134
Public input into agency decision-making does not by itself 
drive all of these requirements, and we do not mean to suggest 
that it does. What it does do, however, is serve as a critical spur 
for judicial review. It helps courts to prod agencies to defend 
their actions as they “reweigh and reconcile . . . often nebulous 
or conflicting policies . . . in the context of a particular factual 
situation with a particular constellation of affected interests.”
 
135 
By forcing agencies to defend their actions in light of competing 
facts and values, participation helps courts to ensure that 
agency action aims at some honest vision of the public good.136
Thus, even though notice-and-comment procedures have 
proven to be costly, courts and scholars criticize agency proce-
dures that cut the public out of the process. Policymaking 
through case-by-case adjudication is one example, particularly 
where adjudications are ill-publicized and inaccessible. The 
D.C. Circuit has criticized such an approach as “pure ad 
  
                                                                                 
 132. See PIERCE ET AL., supra note 102, § 7.5, at 391–97; see also Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 42–43. 
 133. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). 
 134. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842 (1984). 
 135. Stewart, supra note 79, at 1684. 
 136. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (“[P]ublic participation assures that the agency will have before it the 
facts and information relevant to a particular administrative prob-
lem . . . [and] increase[s] the likelihood of administrative responsiveness to the 
needs and concerns of those affected.” (alterations in original) (quoting Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
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hocery” that is inconsistent with important participatory val-
ues.137 Agencies’ increasing use of informal guidance documents 
to establish enforcement and regulatory priorities has sparked 
similar concerns. Nina Mendelson has shown how the use of 
guidance documents is especially likely to cut input by diffuse 
regulatory beneficiaries out of the process.138 Courts have like-
wise criticized agencies for using guidance to make policy slow-
ly without either public input or the opportunity for judicial re-
view.139 As if to underscore the point, the Supreme Court has 
stressed that Chevron deference is presumptive where the 
agency’s interpretation has been run through “a relatively for-
mal administrative procedure tending to foster . . . fairness and 
deliberation,” such as notice-and-comment rulemaking.140
C. CRIMINAL LAW’S INSULARITY  
 
Many of the same institutional conditions that drove sup-
port for public input into agency decision-making underlie criti-
cisms of plea bargaining. Federal prosecutorial power expanded 
rapidly throughout the twentieth century, particularly during 
Prohibition, the New Deal, and the last four decades.141 As 
criminal laws multiplied, so did prosecutors’ discretion to 
charge and enforce. And as plea bargaining replaced trials as 
the dominant mode of resolving cases, discretion to charge and 
enforce quickly became discretion to sentence. That gave prose-
cutors enormous practical control over determining and imple-
menting criminal law policy.142
                                                                                 
 137. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: 
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
461, 542 (2003) (describing the participatory shortcomings of policymaking by 
adjudication); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and 
the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 306–07 (2010) (describing the 
participatory benefits of policymaking by rulemaking). 
  
 138. See Mendelson, supra note 93, at 420; see also Franklin, supra note 
137, at 305 (reviewing participation-based criticisms). 
 139. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
 140. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–30 (2001); see also 
Bressman, supra note 137, at 534–45. 
 141. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 884–85. 
 142. See Wright & Miller, Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, supra note 6, at 
30–32, 30 n.1; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 1998, at 8–9 (2001); Lynch, supra note 
6, at 2123 (“The substantive evaluation of the evidence and assessment of the 
defendant’s responsibility is not made in court at all, but within the executive 
branch, in the office of the prosecutor.”). 
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Yet the role of public input in binding governmental actors 
to the public interest has received far less attention in criminal 
than in administrative law. That is in part because of the lin-
gering myths that juries still safeguard the public’s interest in 
crime and punishment and that sentencing remains a predom-
inantly judicial act. Most fundamentally, criminal law has been 
slow to appreciate that prosecutors are now the “real lawmak-
ers” of criminal justice.143 It has thus failed to implement the 
same structural and procedural safeguards upon which admin-
istrative law has long relied.144
The depth and consequences of that failure are well-
illustrated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, tasked with 
formulating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Congress es-
tablished the Commission as an “independent commission in 
the judicial branch,” seeking to insulate it from political pres-
sures and give the commissioners freedom to exercise their ex-
pert judgment on difficult issues of sentencing policy.
  
145 But 
Congress also exempted it from the most important procedures 
designed to ensure honesty, transparency, and accountability 
in federal rulemaking, including meaningful notice and com-
ment backed up by judicial review.146 Because courts could not 
invalidate the Federal Guidelines as arbitrary and capricious, 
the Commission did not have to explain its choices, build a fac-
tual record in support of its policies, or respond to public com-
ments with reasoned justifications.147 At the time, Congress 
thought that the Commission would nevertheless adhere to 
even more extensive procedures for seeking early comment, 
“acquaint[ing] itself fully on the issues involved in the promul-
gation of specific guidelines.”148
                                                                                 
 143. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001). 
 
 144. See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1022–28. 
 145. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). 
 146. Specifically, the Commission was subject only to section 553 of the 
APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (2006). It was not subject to any of 
the other requirements in chapter 5 of the APA, such as 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 554–
59. Nor was it subject to the Freedom of Information or the Government in the 
Sunshine Acts, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552, 552b. Most significantly, it was not subject to 
the judicial review provisions in chapter 7 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06. 
 147. See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1631, 1643–44 (2012). 
 148. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 180–81 (1984); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), (p), 
(x) (requiring notice and comment, consultation, and statements of reasons for 
proposed Guidelines amendments). For an early assessment that proved to be 
overly optimistic, see Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Ad-
ministrative Law Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. 
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The reality was far different. As Kate Stith and Amy Bar-
on-Evans explain, facing no real constraints, “[t]he Commission 
was therefore under no pressure to base its actions on reasons, 
evidence, or a sound empirical foundation, and frequently acted 
instead on the basis of political pressure or the Commissioners’ 
personal policy views.”149 It failed to take into account the views 
of trial judges, the defense bar, or others who did not support 
its proposals.150 It ignored suggestions and empirically ground-
ed analyses from probation officers and others in the field, of-
fering no justification apart from past practice for many sen-
tence levels.151 It made key policy choices that were 
unsupported by evidence, such as the decision to dismiss most 
mitigating offender characteristics as irrelevant to the purposes 
of sentencing.152 And, while nominally soliciting public input, it 
promulgated amendments that differed from those proposed for 
comment, leaving stakeholders no opportunity to respond.153 
The guidelines that resulted have long been criticized as unin-
telligible, complex, and unjust. The Commission’s approach 
“significantly impaired the legitimacy of the Commission’s 
rulemaking process” and undermined its credibility with the 
public.154
                                                                                                                                                                             
L. REV. 3, 7–16, 22–23 (1991). 
 
 149. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1644; see also Samuel L. 
Buffone, Control of Arbitrary Sentencing Guidelines: Is Administrative Law 
the Answer?, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 139 (1991) (Commission relied on “the 
instincts or political judgment of the individual commissioners rather than a 
sound empirical basis”). 
 150. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643.  
 151. See id. at 1644–45; Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 
15–18 (1988); Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the “Junior Varsity Congress”: A 
Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1202 (1999) (“The Commission . . . rarely justifies its 
guidelines, consistently avoids on-the-record decisionmaking, and operates 
unencumbered by the procedural safeguards that ensure the political legiti-
macy of other administrative agencies.”). 
 152. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1723–24; see also Breyer, 
supra note 151, at 19–20.  
 153. See Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643; Ronald F. Wright, 
Amendments in the Route to Sentencing Reform, 13 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 58, 64 
(1994) (noting lack of open meetings by Commission’s advisory committees and 
conclusory nature of the Commission’s explanations for its final Guidelines, 
without the supporting factual evidence or responses to important comments 
typically offered by most rule-making agencies). 
 154. Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: 
Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
217, 229 (2005). The same problems infect some state guidelines. See BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
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The same problems of opacity and insularity infect prose-
cutorial charging and bargaining. Unlike sentencing commis-
sions, prosecutors are not formally charged with formulating 
sentencing policy as a matter of law. But they undoubtedly ex-
ercise their charging and bargaining authority to make such 
policy in fact. When they do, they very often confront the same 
sort of intractable tradeoffs that exist in other areas of regula-
tory policymaking. Many charging and bargaining decisions in-
volve difficult value judgments about how to spend limited re-
sources in light of a host of competing and incommensurable 
factors.155 These include the need for retribution and deter-
rence, concerns for victims and communities, equality, patterns 
of police enforcement, and the relative notoriety of some 
crimes.156
The public interest in plea bargaining, like the public in-
terest in other administrative decisions, is a “texture of multi-
ple strands” that “involves a balance of many interests” not al-
ways in harmony.
  
157 Prosecutors must “reweigh and 
reconcile . . . often nebulous or conflicting policies . . . in the 
context of a particular factual situation with a particular con-
stellation of affected interests.”158
III.  CRAFTING A SYSTEM OF NOTICE-AND-COMMENT 
SENTENCING   
 And, in the absence of any ob-
jective guidepost of the public good, they should do so against 
the background of the public’s information and values, explain-
ing their decisions and justifying the tradeoffs involved. 
While the analogy is far from exact, criminal sentencing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
STRUCTURED SENTENCING 36–37 tbl.4-1 (1996), available at https://www 
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/strsent.pdf (compiling descriptions of state sentencing guide-
line commissions, not all of which include members of the public). 
 155. See, e.g., Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecuto-
rial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1439, 1446–63 (2004) (examining reasons for prosecutorial declination 
decisions).  
 156. See id. See generally Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: 
Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 
(2005) (examining normative, resource-allocation, and other tradeoffs in the 
design of state sentencing systems). 
 157. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting); Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 360 (1972). 
 158. Stewart, supra note 79, at 1684; see also Wright & Miller, Accountabil-
ity Deficit, supra note 6, at 1594 (“In the administration of crime policy, as in 
other government activities, expertise has become essential, yet justice offi-
cials must also come to terms with public input.”). 
  
2012] NOTICE-AND-COMMENT SENTENCING 35 
 
could learn a good deal from administrative law. Applying ad-
ministrative law principles does not mean mirroring how agen-
cies implement them, especially at the retail level of deciding 
individual cases. The particular procedures that work for de-
veloping nationwide emissions standards are far too slow and 
rigid for criminal adjudications. Nevertheless, administrative 
law principles could inform the range of wholesale and retail 
decisions that influence sentences downstream, including sen-
tencing-guidelines, charging, plea bargaining, and possibly ar-
rest decisions. Those principles support broad rights to partici-
pate, reasoned sentencing decisions, and appellate review. 
These changes would check agents’ discretion and bolster the 
legitimacy of sentencing, increasing transparency and account-
ability and fostering better outcomes.  
A. WHOLESALE OR RETAIL? 
Sentencing-related decisions occur at multiple levels. Indi-
vidual officers decide whether to arrest; individual prosecutors 
decide how to charge and plea bargain; and individual judges 
decide how to sentence individual defendants. These are retail 
decisions. Traditionally, most of the action was at the retail 
level. But increasingly, retail decisions are powerfully shaped 
by a variety of wholesale-level standards, including statutes, 
guidelines, policies, and norms.  
The pros and cons of wholesale versus retail decision-
making, and rules versus case-by-case adjudication, are well 
known.159 Rules promise greater consistency and allow broader 
input from a wider range of people, which bolsters their legiti-
macy. As they provide advance notice, they can more easily 
shape conduct ex ante. The downsides can include rigidity and 
the difficulty of specifying and weighting the relevant criteria 
in advance.160
                                                                                 
 159. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES (1991). 
 Case-by-case decisions are more flexible, allowing 
decision-makers to tailor sentences ex post. They can thus re-
flect the particular facts and factors at issue, especially atypical 
or hard-to-codify circumstances. They can also more easily in-
clude the harms suffered, evidence, and possibly views of the 
persons most affected by the decision. But case-by-case deci-
sions risk being arbitrary or discriminatory, too slow and cost-
 160. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. 
L.J. 1743, 1754–56 (2005) (discussing definitional spillovers inherent in rules 
and the impact they have on deterrence).  
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ly, and too narrowly focused and shortsighted.161
We propose a mixture of wholesale- and retail-level re-
forms. At a minimum, prosecutors’ offices, sentencing commis-
sions, and probably police departments should apply notice-
and-comment principles in adopting wholesale policies. They 
should propose policies, solicit public comment on them, re-
spond to important comments, and publish final policies with 
reasoned justifications.
 
162 As we discuss below, most of these 
policies should be judicially reviewable at the wholesale level, 
whether or not individual defendants or victims can challenge 
their application. The policies could be framed with some gen-
erality, exceptions, and room to evolve.163
Readers convinced by our wholesale solutions could stop 
there. Adopting policies would be most analogous to adminis-
trative notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the costs and de-
lays would be easiest to bear at the wholesale level. But we 
propose going further, to apply notice-and-comment-like princi-
ples to at least the most visible and serious cases at the retail 
level. Temporally, retail notice and comment would occur at in-
dividual sentencing hearings. But at those hearings, judges 
would review a host of upstream decisions that affect sentenc-
es, most notably the charges and plea bargains upon which 
prosecutors agree. When prosecutors had declined to charge at 
all, there would be no sentencing hearing at which to review 
these decisions, so retail notice and comment would not apply 
to individual declinations. When prosecutors had struck charge 
bargains, however, judges would review those bargains.
 Even so, they would 
furnish benchmarks and concrete guidance to police, prosecu-
tors, judges, legislatures, and the public. 
164
                                                                                 
 161. See id. at 1755–56. 
 As 
 162. See supra Section II.B (discussing basic notice-and-comment princi-
ples). An example of what we envision is the U.S. Department of Justice’s poli-
cy on selecting charges. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.300 (1997). The most recent version of that policy 
instructs federal prosecutors ordinarily to charge and not drop the most seri-
ous readily provable offense. Id. But it goes on to identify factors that prosecu-
tors may consider in assessing, case by case, how stringently to apply this pol-
icy when charging and plea bargaining. See id.  
 163. See Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 515, 601–02 (2000) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation, 
and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
925, 927 (1960)) (discussing how formally adopted policies can serve as “estab-
lished starting points for reasoning, pointing the decision-maker in a specific 
direction without mandating a particular result” or precluding flexibility when 
circumstances dictate). 
 164. When prosecutors agreed to a deferred prosecution before filing a 
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Part IV notes, costs and delays loom larger at the retail level, 
and practical constraints limit the numbers and kinds of cases 
covered. With those caveats, we suggest that both levels of de-
cision-making could benefit from notice-and-comment-type pro-
cesses.  
The wholesale and retail levels would interact. Wholesale 
policies would structure retail decisions ab initio, and patterns 
of retail decisions could later prompt new policies or amend-
ments in light of experience. Commenters on proposed whole-
sale rules could draw attention to patterns of retail cases, and 
commenters in individual cases could point to the purposes and 
limits of applicable rules. Pragmatism calls for allowing some 
ex post input to clarify concepts, such as retribution, that rules 
cannot precisely specify ahead of time. The reasoning justifying 
decisions at each level could take account of the lessons learned 
at the other level. Ideally, the combined system would be dy-
namic and evolutionary.165
B. AT THE WHOLESALE LEVEL: ARRESTS, CHARGING, PLEA 
BARGAINING, GUIDELINES, AND SENTENCING  
 It would learn gradually from the 
collective wisdom embodied in patterns of individual decisions 
while ironing out inconsistencies and outliers. 
Our goal is to improve the functioning and legitimacy of 
the sentencing process. But criminal procedure is a stream, and 
decisions upstream have profound consequences for the justice 
that flows downstream. Police arrests, prosecutors’ charging 
decisions, and sentencing guidelines structure plea bargaining, 
which in turn channels discretion at sentencing. Conversely, 
plea and sentencing hearings may allow judges to revisit up-
stream decisions before accepting pleas or imposing sentences.  
Police traditionally enjoy broad latitude in whether to ar-
rest or not, so long as they meet the low threshold of probable 
cause.166
                                                                                                                                                                             
charge, there would be no hearing at which to review the decision. But judges 
could review post-charge deferred prosecution decisions at hearings on wheth-
er to adjourn the charge in contemplation of dismissal. 
 Likewise, prosecutors traditionally enjoy broad discre-
tion in whether and how to charge, so judges have been hesi-
 165. See, e.g., David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 7 n.16 (1992) (reviewing conceptions of legal decision-making as a dialogic 
activity). 
 166. See, e.g., John Koerner, Between Healthy and Hartman: Probable 
Cause in Retaliatory Arrest Cases, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 755, 785–86 (2009) (dis-
cussing arrest discretion). 
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tant to regulate prosecutorial charging.167 Prosecutors, the 
thinking goes, are in the best position to weigh enforcement 
priorities and the need for general deterrence, and revealing 
their enforcement policies could chill enforcement and under-
mine prosecutorial effectiveness.168
Courts and other actors can, however, achieve the same 
goal in less intrusive ways. For example, as Ronald Wright has 
pointed out, judges, legislatures, or sentencing commissions 
could prompt prosecutors to self-regulate by making them draft 
their own charging guidelines.
 Like prosecutors, police la-
bor under resource constraints, and they do not want to tele-
graph situations in which they will not arrest, lest they 
encourage crimes below that threshold. Thus, courts abjure dic-
tating which arrests and charges police and prosecutors should 
pursue or bargain away. 
169 At plea and sentencing hear-
ings, judges could then review prosecutors’ consistency or their 
reasons for deviating from those guidelines. Wright points to 
the example of New Jersey: The New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that the imbalance of prosecutorial power over mandatory 
minimum sentences, coupled with limits on judges’ traditional 
sentencing discretion, would violate the state separation of 
powers.170 The court required the state attorney general to draft 
guidelines to instruct county prosecutors on when to seek en-
hanced sentences for repeat drug offenders.171
                                                                                 
 167. “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the ac-
cused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); 
see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468, 470 (1996) (requiring a 
high evidentiary threshold before a defendant can even obtain discovery to 
help prove a claim of racially selective prosecution); Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“This broad discretion [to decide whether to prose-
cute] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particu-
larly ill-suited to judicial review.”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
123–24 (1979) (finding no constitutional problem in allowing prosecutors to 
choose among overlapping charges with differing penalties, absent unconstitu-
tional discrimination). 
 The attorney 
general complied, instructing trial attorneys on when to trigger 
enhancements, how big plea discounts should be in ordinary 
cases, and what aggravating or mitigating factors might justify 
 168. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607. 
 169. See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of 
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1027–42 (2005). 
 170. Id. at 1030–31 (citing State v. Lagares, 601 A.2d 698, 701–05 (N.J. 
1992)). 
 171. See Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704. 
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larger or smaller discounts.172 In each case, prosecutors had to 
explain why they were or were not seeking the extended sen-
tences.173 Sentencing courts would then review prosecutors’ ac-
tions in light of the guidelines and stated reasons to determine 
whether (as in administrative law) they had exercised their 
discretion arbitrarily and capriciously.174
Several years’ experience showed that local variations in 
prosecutorial policies let troubling disparities remain.
  
175 Thus, 
six years after the initial guidelines, the state supreme court 
directed the attorney general to issue new guidelines that al-
lowed less regional variation.176 The attorney general complied, 
issuing prosecutorial guidelines that keyed plea offers to the 
seriousness of the crime, the defendant’s criminal history, and 
the timing of the plea.177 The attorney general tweaked the 
guidelines over the next few years, and, after six years and con-
sultation with judges, defense attorneys, and county prosecu-
tors, issued a major overhaul of the guidelines.178
The New Jersey experience was not perfect. The guidelines 
that resulted were still largely expert-driven, and, as with the 
Federal Guidelines, members of the public were not integral to 
the process.
 
179
                                                                                 
 172. See Wright, supra note 
 But it teaches that sentencing judges can review 
upstream charging and plea-bargaining decisions downstream, 
at sentencing, without usurping the prosecutorial role. Retail-
level cases can prompt wholesale-level charging and bargaining 
policies that are refined over time in light of future retail cases 
169, at 1031 (citing N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. 
SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE NO. 1996-03 (1996)). 
 173. E.g., State v. Vasquez, 609 A.2d 29, 32 (N.J. 1992). 
 174. See Wright, supra note 169, at 1031 (citing State v. Leonardis, 375 
A.2d 607, 618–19 (N.J. 1977)); see also Lagares, 601 A.2d at 704–05; Vasquez, 
609 A.2d at 32. 
 175. Wright, supra note 169, at 1031.  
 176. See id. at 1031–32 (citing State v. Brimage, 706 A.2d 1096, 1107 (N.J. 
1998)). 
 177. See, e.g., N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL DI-
RECTIVE NO. 1998-1: PROSECUTING CASES UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG 
REFORM ACT (1998), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agdir.pdf; 
N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR NE-
GOTIATING CASES UNDER N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12 (1998), available at http://www 
.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/pdfs/agguid.pdf. 
 178. Wright, supra note 169, at 1032–33; see also N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. 
SAFETY, BRIMAGE GUIDELINES 2 (2004 REVISIONS), available at http://www 
.nj.gov/lps/dcj/agguide/brimage_all.pdf. 
 179. See Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain 
in New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1094 n.31 (2005) (discussing the 
speed with which the New Jersey Attorney General promulgated the guide-
lines). 
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and input from the bench and bar, creating a feedback loop.180
While the New Jersey example did not involve public in-
put, courts could use these same tools to catalyze public input 
into upstream decisions, encouraging police and prosecutors to 
take a notice-and-comment approach to guidelines. Some pros-
ecutors’ offices, such as that of Kitsap County, Washington, al-
ready do just that.
 
Outside oversight and pushback helps to ensure that guidelines 
do not remain hopelessly vague generalities but offer increas-
ingly concrete guidance. And rather than drafting guidelines 
themselves, judges can prod prosecutors to self-regulate their 
upstream decisions. By prompting guidelines and reasons, 
judges can elicit both better sentencing information in individ-
ual cases and more consistent exercises of discretion across 
cases. 
181 Since 1995, the Kitsap County prosecu-
tor’s office has published charging and plea-bargaining 
guidelines intended to “answer[] . . . most . . . questions about 
[its] approach to charging and disposing of criminal cases.”182 
The guidelines manual does so in detail, by, for example, rank-
ing enforcement priorities in descending order,183 differentiating 
charging standards based on categories of crime,184 and spelling 
out criteria for sentencing and diversion.185 But “its true value 
comes from the way it was developed.”186 Volunteer citizens’ 
groups and representatives from local government, police agen-
cies, the defense bar, and the community at large had direct in-
put into the process. Their input challenged the office to define 
its role and required it “to give straight answers.”187 When re-
viewing prosecutors’ actions downstream, courts could consider 
how thoroughly applicable guidelines had been vetted, perhaps 
deferring more where they resulted from a participatory, open, 
accountable process.188
                                                                                 
 180. See Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
459, 484 (2009) (discussing feedback loops that could flow from meaningful 
sentencing explanations on the record). 
  
 181. See RUSSELL D. HAUGE, OFFICE OF KITSAP CNTY. PROSECUTING AT-
TORNEY, MISSION STATEMENT AND STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES 1 (2007), 
available at http://www.kitsapgov.com/pros/StandardsGuidelines2007.pdf. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at 4.  
 184. Id. at 6–9. 
 185. Id. at 10–15.  
 186. Id. at 1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See infra text accompanying notes 263–269 (discussing appellate re-
view); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221, 227 (2001) (stating 
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Another lesson from New Jersey is that not all charging 
decisions are alike. People often lump all enforcement and 
charging decisions together, but not all decisions fit the same 
mold. Some charging and arrest decisions are classic decisions 
not to pursue certain wrongdoers at all because of insufficient 
evidence, limited resources, or similar factors.189 On the one 
hand, these can be seen as classic enforcement decisions involv-
ing non-judicial issues of resource allocation, and their revela-
tion might telegraph to prospective wrongdoers that crimes be-
low certain thresholds will not be pursued at all. There is thus 
some argument that such decisions touch core issues of discre-
tion, entrusted to the executive and less suited to judicial re-
view or public involvement.190 On the other hand, decisions not 
to arrest and not to charge can contribute to patterns of sen-
tencing inequality and otherwise implicate the public’s concern 
for justice.191
Thus, at the wholesale level, we tentatively favor requiring 
advance notice, public deliberation, revisions based on input, 
and reasoned justifications for declination and perhaps arrest 
policies. Offices could also give notice that they were developing 
entire groups of rules, such as plea-bargaining guidelines, and 
solicit input in their large-scale development processes.
 Particularly where proof problems are absent, dec-
lination can result from early, hidden plea bargaining, cloaking 
prosecutors’ value judgments and substantive decisions about 
whether and how to punish. 
192
                                                                                                                                                                             
that deference to administrative authority may be shown by an agency’s power 
to “engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking”).  
  
 189. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 125, 136 tbl.1 (2008) (laying out some of the most common reasons for de-
clining to bring charges). 
 190. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has rec-
ognized on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to 
prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision 
generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion . . . . This recognition of 
the existence of discretion is attributable in no small part to the general un-
suitability for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement.”). 
 191. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial 
Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for “Fixed” and “Presumptive” Sentenc-
ing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 564 (1978) (“[T]he discretion of American prosecu-
tors lends itself to inequalities and disparities of treatment because of disa-
greements concerning issues of sentencing policy . . . . It may also lead to a 
general perception of unfairness, arbitrariness and uncertainty and may even 
undercut the deterrent force of the criminal law.”). 
 192. At the federal level, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) does something similar with its annual Unified Regulatory Agenda, 
which it publishes in the Federal Register. The Unified Regulatory Agenda 
compiles the regulatory agendas from all federal entities that have regulations 
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These notices could be posted on government websites and 
criminal justice blogs, as well as in the traditional criminal jus-
tice periodicals, community newspapers, and government pub-
lications like the Federal Register (or state equivalents). As in 
other areas of policymaking, the aim would be to better incor-
porate the facts, preferences, and values of the public into craft-
ing prosecutorial polices. Prosecutors’ offices could even use 
surveys to help rank the public’s values and concerns for cer-
tain categories of crimes, punishments, or enforcement criteria, 
much as agencies’ willingness-to-pay surveys elicit the relative 
values of lives, jobs, and the environment.193 Many organiza-
tions would have the incentives and expertise to contribute a 
range of perspectives by commenting on the issues at stake. 
Likely commenters include academics, public defenders, crimi-
nal-defense organizations, civil-liberties groups, victim advo-
cates, police unions, prosecutor organizations, and bar authori-
ties.194
Police and prosecutorial policies could be non-binding, or 
binding and subject to exceptions. But they would still set 
benchmarks against which the public could evaluate police and 
prosecutors, much like the enforcement guidelines already used 
by many agencies.
 
195 As Erik Luna has proposed, community 
input could, for example, guide police policies on using force 
and limiting vice enforcement.196
                                                                                                                                                                             
under development or review. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 642 
(1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006); see also Exec. Order No. 
13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2011); Christopher Demuth, OIRA at Thirty, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 15, 16 (2011) (discussing history of OIRA’s 
approach to the annual agenda). 
 Such input into declination 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 194. See infra notes 297–299 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 196. Luna, supra note 163, at 590–623. See also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
POLICE DISCRETION 98–120 (1975), WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST 513 (1965), 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 423–28 (1974), and Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 502 (1971), for 
examples of other earlier and notable proposals to use rulemaking to guide 
and constrain police practices. For examples of more modern takes on the is-
sue, see Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 
658–63 (1997) (discussing the role of guidelines in community and problem-
oriented policing), David Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1271–79 (2002) (discussing the evo-
lution—or lack thereof—of police rulemaking in the Fourth Amendment con-
text since Professor Amsterdam’s 1974 article), and David Sklansky Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (connecting evolving conceptions of 
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and possibly arrest policies would guard against discriminatory 
patterns of enforcement and increase public legitimacy. Kitsap 
County, for one, already publishes its declination guidelines, 
suggesting that fears of publicity are overblown.197 Kitsap 
County’s policy expressly differentiates between its willingness 
to decline property and violent crimes, stating its willingness to 
proceed with the latter based on weaker evidence.198
Many charging issues are not really enforcement decisions 
but sentencing decisions. Often, the government has investi-
gated, arrested, and decided to prosecute the wrongdoer and 
can prove his guilt any number of ways. At that point, the pros-
ecutor files specific charges in order to promise or threaten a 
specific sentence and thereby induce a plea. Charge-bargaining 
decisions implicate classic sentencing considerations such as 
equality, remorse, and the goals of punishment.
 It stakes 
out its potentially controversial position publicly, opening it to 
scrutiny and debate. 
199
Reforms should address not only the sentencing pipeline 
from police to prosecutor to judge, but also the guidelines 
promulgated by sentencing commissions. The widely criticized 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines emerged from a secretive, insular 
process that nominally involved public comment but in fact in-
cluded no meaningful public deliberation, justifications, or judi-
cial review.
 When the 
question is not whether to arrest and prosecute but how much 
to punish, judges can more easily bring arbitrary-and-
capricious review and similar administrative law tools to bear. 
Sentencing is a judicial decision amenable to review. Both 
wholesale and retail charging and plea-bargaining decisions 
that amount to sentencing decisions could easily receive the 
same treatment. 
200 The Federal Guidelines rarely evolve in light of 
retail feedback.201
                                                                                                                                                                             
democracy to jurisprudential and academic approaches to policing). 
 Yet federal courts still routinely defer to the 
 197. See HAUGE, supra note 181, at 6–9. 
 198. Id. at 6–7. 
 199. See Mary Patrice Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: 
Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Co-
lumbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1076–84 (2006) (discussing the role of such 
considerations in both informal and formal plea bargaining). 
 200. See supra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
 201. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 56–57, 94–95 (1998) (describ-
ing the Federal Guidelines as “simply a compilation of administrative diktats” 
because “the Commission almost never explains the reason behind a particu-
lar Guidelines rule”). 
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Commission without requiring the statements of reasons de-
manded of other agencies.202
In marked contrast to the federal experience, many states 
have succeeded by applying these lessons.
 The lesson of the Federal Guide-
lines is that a sentencing commission must do more than just 
solicit public input and then disregard it. Sentencing commis-
sions should instead take input seriously, deliberate over it, re-
spond to substantial comments, offer clear reasoning, and face 
judicial review of both wholesale guidelines and the retail sen-
tences that apply them. 
203 Many states’ guide-
lines emerged from deliberative processes that included a vari-
ety of lawyers and laymen, such as victims and even convicts.204 
A more open commission is more likely to listen to and show re-
spect for each voice, deliberate over the inevitable hard choices, 
create buy-in, and adopt simple guidelines that turn on obvi-
ously relevant criteria.205 And transparent, reasoned guidelines 
are better able to evolve.206 New criticisms and unexpected cas-
es can challenge the expressed rationales for guidelines, lead-
ing sentencing commissions to refine or revisit their initial 
rules in light of experience.207 At the retail level, individual sen-
tencing judges can justify deviations based on factors that were 
not adequately taken into account in formulating guidelines. In 
Federal-Guideline-speak, those are cases that fall outside the 
heartland of typical cases.208
                                                                                 
 202. See id. at 57 (noting that “unlike the rules of other federal agencies, 
the Sentencing Guidelines may not be challenged in court” for being arbitrary 
or capricious); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy 
Decisions After Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 724 (2009) (observing that 
existing approaches to appellate review of the Guidelines run “counter to ordi-
nary principles of administrative law”); Stith & Dunn, supra note 
 An accumulation of such individu-
154, at 229–
33 (discussing lack of judicial review of the Guidelines and the Sentencing 
Commission’s reasoning). 
 203. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 
758–87 (2005) (contrasting the failures of the insular U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission with the successes of the more inclusive Minnesota, Washington, and 
North Carolina commissions). 
 204. See id. at 771–87; see also Dale Parent, What Did the United States 
Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 YALE L.J. 1773, 1775–77 (1992) (discussing 
Minnesota guidelines); Wright, supra note 153, at 63 (discussing Wisconsin, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Washington, Utah, and Minnesota guidelines). 
 205. See Parent, supra note 204, at 1777–78 (discussing Minnesota experi-
ence). 
 206. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357–58 (2007) (explain-
ing how feedback, input, and reasoned responses from the Sentencing Com-
mission enables the Guidelines to evolve). 
 207. See Stith & Dunn, supra note 154, at 228–29. 
 208. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1, ch. 1, pt. A, intro. 
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al cases may signal that it is time to reexamine the general rule 
in light of experience, perhaps because the atypical case may 
have become typical.209
The Federal Guidelines were supposed to embody such an 
evolutionary process, but the rigid, insular federal process has 
not lived up to that promise.
 More problematically, the typical sen-
tence may continue to generate such resistance that it suggests 
the commission should reconsider its rule.  
210 Yet there is no inherent reason 
why it could not. Many federal agencies—including the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, the Mine Safety and Health Administra-
tion, and the Federal Aviation Administration—have used 
notice and comment to produce what are effectively sentencing 
guidelines for their administrative penalty systems, periodical-
ly refining those guidelines in light of experience.211
A final lesson of the New Jersey experience is that, as in 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cmt. 4(b) (2006). 
 209. See Stith & Dunn, supra note 154, at 229–30; Rita, 551 U.S. at 357–58 
(explaining how the reasoned sentencing judgments of individual judges con-
tribute to the Guidelines’ evolution). 
 210. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), (C) (2006) (stating Sentencing Commis-
sion’s goals of promoting fairness and equal treatment while maintaining flex-
ibility and reflecting advancements in knowledge of human behavior as it re-
lates to criminal justice); O’Hear, supra note 180, at 484 (discussing “the 
evolutionary process that guidelines development is intended to be”). 
 211. See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 28 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (set-
ting aside FCC civil penalty schedule for failure to conform to notice-and-
comment procedures under the APA); Rules of Practice for FAA Civil Penalty 
Actions, 55 Fed. Reg. 7980, 7980 (Mar. 6, 1990) (inviting public comment on 
changes to rules of practice regarding FAA’s civil penalty authority); Civil 
Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,882, 39,882 (Ju-
ly 3, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 19, 27) (requesting comments re-
garding the EPA’s proposed inflation adjustment to civil monetary penalties); 
Criteria and Procedures for Proposed Assessment of Civil Penalties, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 13,592 (Mar. 22, 2007) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 100) (promulgating 
final rule of Mine Safety and Health Administration revising civil penalty as-
sessment regulations and incorporating revisions suggested during notice-and-
comment period); Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories, Supplier’s Dec-
laration of Conformity, 73 Fed. Reg. 62,327, 62,337 (Oct. 20, 2008) (seeking 
comment regarding OSHA’s administration of a Supplier’s Declaration of Con-
formity system for policing the safety of certain products in the workplace, in-
cluding comments on the use of penalties to sanction “inaccurate or incomplete 
information”); see also Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 853, 869, 872–73 (2012) (reviewing civil penalty guidelines of the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration and FCC). Even when agencies do not use 
the formal notice-and-comment procedure, they frequently publish detailed 
but non-binding guidelines, which they periodically revise based on experience 
and informal input from stakeholders. See supra note 120 and accompanying 
text.  
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administrative law, individual adjudications can be bound up 
with generating, applying, and refining rules. Judges adjudi-
cate concrete cases or controversies, but in doing so they con-
sider proffered reasons and patterns of disparate enforcement 
and outcomes.212 Sometimes those reasons and patterns are 
rooted in formal or informal policies, but sometimes they 
emerge from individual, case-by-case decisions.213 In either sce-
nario, judges and the public can prod prosecutors to self-
regulate, promulgating and explaining their rules while speci-
fying exceptions and leaving some wiggle room. As prosecutors 
apply these guidelines to offer reasons for individual sentences, 
judges and members of the public can ensure consistency and 
prompt further refinements and revisions.214
The more general point here is that, to be meaningful, in-
put and review must come in time. If judges at plea colloquies 
accept charge or sentence bargains that effectively dictate par-
ticular sentences, sentencing becomes a charade. The time-
sensitivity of input and review argues in favor of having judges 
defer acceptance of charge bargains and stipulated sentences 
until sentencing, where they can more pointedly question both 
the wholesale policies and retail considerations driving pro-
posed punishments. Courts already have this power, but defer-
ring acceptance could be required, or at least become the 
 The process is it-
erative and collaborative, with room for feedback and incre-
mental improvements. It respects prosecutors’ superior 
knowledge and resource constraints but calls on them to weigh 
these factors and justify workable policies. And it demonstrates 
how individual adjudications can go hand in hand with ongoing 
systemic reform. 
                                                                                 
 212. Cf. Lemoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(observing that the need for an agency to explain itself and distinguish analo-
gous cases is “particularly acute” when the agency makes policy through case-
by-case adjudication, because it ensures predictability, intelligibility, and 
equal treatment).  
 213. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947) (discussing agen-
cies’ ability to establish policies through general rules or “the case-by-case evo-
lution of statutory standards”); White, supra note 53, at 449–53 (same, in con-
text of plea bargaining). 
 214. See Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 175, 180–82 (2005) (discussing how reason-giving and appellate review 
can function as a feedback tool in sentencing, engaging courts in an extended 
conversation between sentencing commissions and legislatures); Wright & 
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1611 (“As the topics addressed 
in general guidelines multiply, questions can arise about the basis for the poli-
cy choices built into the guidelines.”). 
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norm.215
Time-sensitivity also argues in favor of allowing citizens to 
challenge finally adopted, binding, wholesale policies at the 
time of their promulgation, as is common in administrative 
law. Because of the breadth of public interest in criminal jus-
tice, any citizen of the jurisdiction should be able to bring such 
a challenge.
 
216 The process would function much as it does in 
any garden-variety challenge to a final agency rule. After the 
sentencing commission, prosecutor’s office, or other policymak-
ing body issued a final rule, the reviewing court would apply 
some variant of hard-look review, examining the record and the 
explanation accompanying the rule to ensure that the policy-
maker had responded to significant comments, considered the 
relevant evidence and data, explored reasonable alternatives, 
and otherwise not acted arbitrarily or capriciously.217 As courts 
reviewing administrative agency policies have occasionally 
done, reviewing courts also could relax threshold ripeness and 
finality requirements to allow significant but technically non-
binding guidance documents to be immediately challenged at 
the promulgation stage, particularly where it is clear that the 
guidance effectively establishes on-the-ground policy in the 
mine-run of cases.218
C. AT THE RETAIL LEVEL 
 
Something analogous to notice and comment could also op-
erate at the retail level of at least some individual sentencings. 
The formality of procedure that accompanies true notice and 
comment of the administrative law sort would be far too cum-
bersome if simply transferred over to retail sentencing hear-
ings. But the concepts and principles that underlie notice and 
comment—advance notice, inclusion of a range of views, and 
                                                                                 
 215. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (authorizing courts to accept, re-
ject, or defer decisions on charge or stipulated-sentence bargains until after 
the court reviews the presentence report). 
 216. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any “person . . . adversely affected 
or aggrieved” within the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judi-
cial review of agency action). 
 217. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
 218. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 380–81 (D.C. Cir. 2002); 
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 
1998); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320–21 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988); see also Mendelson, supra note 93, at 438–44 (describing possible 
approaches to and standards for judicial review of significant guidance docu-
ments at the promulgation stage). 
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meaningful consideration of those views by the decision-maker, 
against a backstop of judicial review—could inform retail par-
ticipation. These concepts would apply loosely and with less 
formality than in full-blown rulemaking, but still subject to 
sentencing’s procedural safeguards. This section sketches how 
such an approach might look. 
1. Who and How: Advance Notice 
We see at least two possible models for initiating notice-
and-comment sentencing at the retail level. One would allow 
prosecutors to set the agenda in major cases, as they do now. 
The prosecutor would publish a notice, in writing and on the 
Internet, setting forth the basic facts, charges, and benchmark 
guideline sentences for similar offenders and offenses and pro-
posing a particular plea-bargained sentence. For a set period of 
time, members of the public, victims, defendants, and their 
families could submit written or recorded comments. These 
could include both facts and opinions bearing on the appropri-
ate sentence. The defendant and perhaps the victim could see 
and respond to the various comments, as could the probation 
officer who prepares the presentence report. They might also be 
able to testify in open court. A judge would make the final sen-
tencing determination, taking into account the prosecutor’s ex-
planation, all comments, and responses to those comments. The 
judge would defer where appropriate but still probe the sub-
stance and the reasoning of the recommendation. 
This approach would continue our tradition of leaving 
prosecutors in charge. It would not be a radical change in that 
sense, but it also would do less to fix the excesses of prosecuto-
rial power. For example, prosecutors’ initial sentence recom-
mendations would serve as powerful mental anchors that frame 
the terms of debate going forward.219 Empirical evidence shows 
that judges defer heavily to prosecutors’ discretionary recom-
mendations.220
                                                                                 
 219. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 119–28 (2011) 
(describing the anchoring effect, which causes a decision-maker to rank op-
tions based on one piece of information and then adjust upward or downward, 
giving the initial anchor inordinate influence on the final outcome); RICHARD 
H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 23–24 (2008) (describing the same 
effect). 
 
 220. See, e.g., Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making 
and Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 805, 820 (1975) (finding that while in hypothetical 
cases judges relied most heavily on a defendant’s local ties in setting bail, in 
actual cases prosecutors’ recommendations were the single most important 
  
2012] NOTICE-AND-COMMENT SENTENCING 49 
 
The other possible structure would give probation officers 
the power to set the terms of debate. They would issue notices 
of proposed sentencing listing the facts, charges, and guidelines 
calculations specifying a range of sentences, very much like the 
presentence investigation reports that probation officers al-
ready routinely prepare for federal sentencing.221 (This would 
be harder to accomplish in overburdened state courts, where 
funds are tight and presentence investigations are much less 
thorough than in federal cases.) Prosecutors, defendants, vic-
tims, and the public would react and submit their own com-
ments and proposals. As discussed below, the final decision 
would lie in the hands of a judge.222
2. What: The Range of Facts, Factors, and Views 
 At least the most important 
cases might also involve advisory sentencing juries, reflecting 
the public’s shared sense of justice. Judges would render ulti-
mate decisions and issue public, reasoned opinions. The goal is 
to come up with a blend of judicial expertise and public input 
that reflects and balances systemic needs, individualized con-
siderations, and popular concerns.  
There is a range of ways to implement notice and comment 
at sentencing. We envision a ladder of types of retail input, 
which readers may climb as high as they like. Even skeptical 
readers should join us on the first rung of the ladder, acknowl-
edging the importance of factual input bearing on the serious-
ness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the wrongdoer. 
The second rung involves soliciting broader factual information 
relevant, for example, to various justifications for punishment 
or broad concerns about enforcement or sentencing patterns. 
That could include the seriousness of the crime problem in the 
community, the harms suffered by this victim, and how possi-
ble punishments would affect third parties such as the defend-
ant’s family and neighborhood residents. A third rung would 
seek assessments of the factors and values relevant to a partic-
ular sentence, such as the particular defendant’s blameworthi-
ness and factors not taken into account by statutes or sentenc-
ing guidelines. The final, most controversial rung would solicit 
a range of views on the appropriate outcome. On any of these 
rungs, as in administrative law, commenters would enjoy no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
determinant of judges’ bail decisions). 
 221. See NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 496–
504 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing preparation of presentence investigation reports). 
 222. See infra notes 248–256 and accompanying text. 
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decision-making power.223
At the first rung, a small group of people—defendants’ fam-
ilies, doctors, employers, teachers, and neighbors—can offer 
factual information about the individual wrongdoer. Often, 
there are extenuating circumstances ranging from mental 
handicaps to good character and prospects for a law-abiding 
life.
 The courts would ultimately find 
facts, apply the law, weigh the relevant factors, and impose 
sentence. 
224 Good defense lawyers and probation officers already ad-
duce some of this information.225
At the second rung, a somewhat larger group can offer 
broader factual information relevant to sentencing. Victims and 
their families can explain the direct and indirect harms that 
they have suffered from this crime or whether the defendant 
has tried to make amends.
 But currently, prosecutors and 
sentencing judges need not explicitly respond to it, and solicit-
ing input more broadly and systematically might paint more 
complete pictures. This modest effort to systematize what al-
ready happens haphazardly should not be controversial. 
226 Residents of the neighborhood can 
likewise illuminate the harms and fears they have suffered 
from similar recent crimes.227 Commenters can also cast light 
on a variety of remedial and third-party interests.228 They could 
talk about the costs and benefits of incarcerating this wrongdo-
er. Even if a wrongdoer deserves punishment, for example, bar-
ring him from his profession or depriving his family of its 
breadwinner may not prevent future danger or might harm in-
nocent third parties.229
                                                                                 
 223. See supra notes 127–135 and accompanying text (explaining that 
while agencies must take public input seriously, decision-making power re-
mains with the agencies). 
 Neighborhood residents can discuss the 
benefits of prison, restitution, drug treatment, and other alter-
 224. See, e.g., Scott Atlas, How Can We Be Sure?, 29 LITIGATION 1, 1–2 
(2003) (reviewing types of mitigating evidence at sentencing). 
 225. See Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
1561, 1567 (2012) (describing typical submissions from the parties and inter-
ested persons before sentencing); Tess Lopez, Make the Sentencing Process 
Work for You, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 59–60 (describing items defense 
counsel should prepare during the presentence process).  
 226. See Douglas E. Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as 
Participants, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 282, 299–305 (2003) (discussing victim par-
ticipation at sentencing). 
 227. See generally Katie Long, Note, Community Input at Sentencing: Vic-
tim’s Right or Victim’s Revenge?, 75 B.U. L. REV. 187, 195 (1995). 
 228. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1383 (2002). 
 229. See id. at 1390. 
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native sanctions and remedies, and can reflect on what the 
wrongdoer would have to do to redeem himself in the communi-
ty.230
In addition to facts about the crime, at the third rung, 
members of the community can offer a range of perspectives on 
relevant policies and values in the context of the particular 
case. For example, they can debate the wrongfulness of this 
particular crime, the blameworthiness of this wrongdoer, the 
need to deter and incapacitate him, and the like. The array of 
perspectives can only help to inform the sentencer’s ultimate 
balancing of the aims of punishment. They can also reflect upon 
how global, macro-level considerations about enforcement, 
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing apply to this case. 
They could discuss equality, adducing statistics about the sen-
tences awarded to similar defendants and any alleged racial or 
socioeconomic disparities.
 This factual information is highly relevant not only to 
harm-based understandings of retribution, but also to the need 
for deterrence, expressive condemnation, mercy, and for-
giveness. 
231 They could reflect on the costs of 
depriving this community of its young men. They could likewise 
criticize the racial impact of enforcement and charging deci-
sions made earlier in the process, such as enforcement efforts 
targeting this neighborhood.232
Some readers might even be comfortable with a final rung, 
allowing commenters to voice their views on the appropriate 
sentence. Prosecutors and defense lawyers already offer such 
views. Victims, community members, and public interest 
groups could serve as counterweights, offering and justifying 
their own proposed sentences. Expressing these views might 
prove cathartic, venting steam and giving commenters their 
day in court.
 They could criticize the dishon-
esty of a charge bargain or an equivocal guilty plea and ques-
tion the award of a massive discount for a cooperating witness. 
And they could shed light on the public message that various 
sentences here would send to potential wrongdoers and victims. 
233
                                                                                 
 230. See id. at 1390–92. 
 But it would also offer judges a range of opin-
ions upon which to reflect. Sentencing judges would remain 
free to accept or reject these suggestions, but these views could 
 231. See id. at 1401–02. 
 232. See generally David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Dispari-
ties in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 
296–97 (2001). 
 233. See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse 
and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 88–89 (2004). 
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prompt them to consider diverse approaches and explain the 
reasoning supporting their sentences. 
However high up the ladder one goes, we do not suggest 
letting sentencers in individual cases use comments as a basis 
for disregarding wholesale value judgments embodied in appli-
cable guidelines or policies.234
The comment period would remain open for a set time—
say, thirty or sixty days. Comments could be submitted orally 
in open court (at least by the immediate parties), in writing, or 
over the Internet. Some commenters might request that their 
names or their comments not be published beyond the immedi-
ate parties and sentencers, particularly when they discuss sen-
sitive personal information. With those exceptions and redac-
tions, most comments could be made available over the 
Internet, allowing other commenters to reflect on and take is-
sue with one another’s assertions. On some blogs, threads of 
comments degenerate into name-calling, but well-managed 
threads (perhaps moderated by a probation officer) could high-
light areas of consensus and disagreement. E-rulemaking pro-
ponents such as Cynthia Farina have already been grappling 
with how practically to use websites, social media, and other 
new technologies to manage and aggregate public comments, 
and their insights and findings could be brought to bear here.
 Comments on appropriate sen-
tences would carry influence only within the guideline sentenc-
ing range, except when they highlighted unusual factors not 
considered by the guidelines that made those cases atypical. 
Patterns of comments reflecting sustained criticism of guide-
lines might, however, eventually lead to reforming the whole-
sale rules. Ideally, retail comments would form part of a larger 
feedback loop. 
235
                                                                                 
 234. At least, that is, where the guidelines or policies were the product of 
open, participatory, and reasoned processes. Where they resulted from closed, 
insular, and opaque processes that failed to address significant input, evi-
dence, and criticism, some deviations, whether in response to comments or 
not, might be appropriate. Cf. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–
02 (2007) (authorizing district courts to disregard the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines’ 100-to-1 crack-to-powder cocaine ratio for sentencing). 
 
 235. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
395, 412–16, 432–40 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0] (dis-
cussing strategies for facilitating effective online commentary, including the 
use of both trained moderators and systemic design components to stratify and 
manage information and comments); Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 
140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Public Participation in Rule-
making, 31 PACE L. REV. 382, 393–416 (2011) [hereinafter Farina et al., 140 
Characters or Less] (describing case studies involving a pilot Rulemaking 2.0 
project, Regulation Room, that uses web technologies, including Facebook, 
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Before and at sentencing hearings, the parties could read 
and respond to comments raising significant evidentiary or fac-
tual issues, using live rebuttal witnesses, documentary evi-
dence, and reasoned arguments. They might even be able to 
subpoena, cross-examine, and impeach adverse witnesses.236 
There would thus be multiple checks on the accuracy and rep-
resentativeness of commenters’ views: other commenters could 
disagree, the parties would have notice and opportunities to re-
spond, and sentencers would have the final say. That input 
would enjoy more procedural safeguards than the bare hearsay 
that currently fills many probation officers’ presentence re-
ports.237
Allowing such input would inform judges in giving concrete 
meaning to abstract justifications for punishment. In adminis-
trative law, governing statutes often set forth vague standards 
such as public “safety” or the “public interest.”
 
238 The same is 
true of sentencing provisions in criminal law. In federal law, for 
example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) directs sentencing courts to 
consider retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion.239
                                                                                                                                                                             
Twitter, and others, to inform stakeholders of proposed rulemakings and facil-
itate their participation and comments). 
 These concepts, however, are abstract and elastic, and 
they take shape through practical reasoning and application to 
concrete cases. Popular judgments of blameworthiness and just 
deserts, in particular, are quite subtle and influenced by the 
specific circumstances of individual wrongdoers as well as 
 236. Many jurisdictions already provide some version of this process for re-
solving disputed issues of fact relating to sentencing. See ARTHUR W. 
CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 10:4 (3d ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET 
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.4(g) (5th ed. 2009). In the Second Circuit, for 
instance, such hearings are known as Fatico hearings. See United States v. 
Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1057 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 237. See, e.g., Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports: Multi-Tasking 
at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544, 574–76 (1995). 
 238. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1)(B) (2006) (providing that applications 
for use of new drugs shall be denied if the drug is found to be “unsafe”); 47 
U.S.C. § 307(a) (2006) (“The [Federal Communications] Commission, if public 
convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby . . . shall grant to any 
applicant therefore a station license provided for by this chapter.”). 
 239. Section 3553(a)(2) provides, “[t]he court, in determining the particular 
sentence to be imposed, shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective 
manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2006). 
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crimes.240 Public input in a concrete case can reflect the many 
facets of just deserts, helping judges to give desert appropriate 
weight.241
Popular involvement also can legitimate the more eclectic, 
less philosophically pure approach to punishment that exists in 
real-world criminal justice. In an eclectic approach, just deserts 
may be central but tempered by a variety of other considera-
tions such as incapacitation, deterrence, moral reform, restitu-
tion, and apologies.
 
242 Theorists may abhor such a hash, but the 
public, prosecutors, and policymakers care about a fairly wide 
range of factors. Yet it is surprisingly difficult to specify in the 
abstract how much weight each factor deserves, and that 
weight may vary from case to case.243
                                                                                 
 240. See Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Argument by Hypothetical, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 819–23 (2000). See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & 
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND 
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995) (comparing lay views with substantive criminal 
code provisions on a variety of criminal law issues). 
 A more robust feedback 
mechanism for considering these factors in real cases helps to 
check discretion and promote the accountability and legitimacy 
on which criminal justice depends in a democracy. A hybrid 
system can allow both probation officers and the public, both 
judges and juries to have their say, blending expertise with 
popular voice. That range of voices is more likely to lead judges 
toward a consensus middle ground, moderating the idiosyncra-
 241. The Supreme Court’s jury sentencing cases reflect just this notion. See 
Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 994–
1002 (2003); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519–20 (1968) (ex-
plaining capital jury’s sentencing role as “express[ing] the conscience of the 
community” and “speak[ing] for the community”). 
 242. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Psychology of Punishment, 11 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 171, 175–76 (2004) (noting that retribution, rather than con-
sequentialist goals, is central to popular punishment judgments); see also Dar-
ley, supra note 1, at 661–76 (noting empirical evidence of public’s central focus 
on retribution but willingness to consider incapacitation in at least some cas-
es); Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of For-
giveness, Hardship, Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discre-
tionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737 
(2012) (confirming that substantial numbers of respondents are willing to 
modify sentences significantly based on factors such as remorse, apology, for-
giveness, and restitution). 
 243. See Richard A. Bierschbach, Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1745, 1770–72 (2012) (discussing difficulty of specifying appropriate 
weighting of sentencing factors ex ante through general rules); see also CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 43 (1996) (“Any 
simple, general, and monistic or single-valued theory of a large area of the 
law . . . is likely to be too crude to fit with our best understandings of the mul-
tiple values that are at stake in that area.”). 
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sies of a given prosecutor or judge.244 The result should be a 
more well-rounded, inclusive process that reflects upon all the 
relevant factors.245
The broad range of factors requires an equally broad scope 
for comment and input. Collectively, the array of comments 
would amount to a detailed record supporting the sentencing 
decision, permitting more thorough appellate review. Retail 
sentencing decisions by jurors or judges, unlike popular initia-
tives and referenda, rest on detailed facts that can trump gen-
eralized fears and stereotypes.
 
246 They may thus be inoculated 
against “the pathological politics of criminal law.”247
3. To Whom: The Identity and Job of the Sentencer 
 
As suggested above, one could allocate the ultimate power 
to sentence in several different ways. One way is the status 
quo, which leaves sentencing to a single judge. The advantage 
of judicial sentencing is the judge’s expertise and insulation 
from immediate political pressure. But those very advantages 
can be seen as disadvantages, as non-lawyers distrust judges’ 
representativeness and attentiveness to popular moral judg-
ment.248
Another approach, used by only a handful of states, is to 
vest power in a sentencing jury.
 
249
                                                                                 
 244. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 
 That would add a further 
243, at 35–54; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545 (1988) (discussing how injection 
of public perspectives and information into agency policymaking helps to de-
termine the public’s “preferences about preferences”). See Bierschbach & 
Stein, supra note 160, for a similar argument in the context of systemic rules 
for determining criminal liability and punishment.  
 245. See Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and 
the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 124–27 (2001) (arguing that 
rules adopted through the use of negotiated rulemaking have greater legitima-
cy and public acceptance); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why 
Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 73 (2000) (discussing how popular 
participation informs the course of deliberation in a deliberative democracy, 
“combin[ing] popular responsiveness with a high degree of reflection and ex-
change among people with competing views”).  
 246. See Robinson, supra note 240, at 819–23. 
 247. The phrase, though not the particular conception of pathology we are 
discussing, is of course from the title of William J. Stuntz’s The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, supra note 143 (initial capital letters lowercased). 
 248. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future 
Generations: A Proposal for a “Republican” Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
444, 469–70 (1996) (discussing ways in which federal judges “are frequently 
overly insulated from popular values”). 
 249. Six states retain jury sentencing in non-capital cases. See Nancy J. 
King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State 
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measure of democratic legitimacy to sentences, ensuring that 
they track popular moral judgments.250
A compromise, hybrid approach would somehow blend sen-
tencing judges and juries. One could have juries make recom-
mendations but vest final power in judges.
 But, like sentencing by 
popular poll, unfettered jury decision-making raises fears of 
mob rule by ignorant amateurs. 
251 One could give 
sentencing power to juries subject to judicial comment, remit-
titur, or other review.252 Or one could have hybrid lay-expert 
panels, much as German panels comprise professional and lay 
judges.253
The choice along this spectrum depends on how one bal-
ances expertise and democracy. Academics tend to favor exper-
tise and distrust popular input as mob rule; hence, scholars are 
often hostile to juries.
 
254 Voters, on the other hand, may dis-
trust judges and experts and see criminal justice as a matter 
for lay intuition and moral desert. Administrative law offers a 
framework for reconciling these perspectives. Courts defer to 
experts so long as they follow public, transparent procedures 
that solicit a range of input.255 That requires the experts to take 
public input into account and to justify their decisions with on-
the-record reasons. And, within the executive branch, expert 
bureaucrats remain accountable to elected superiors, who can 
reverse or moderate their policies. Expertise and democracy 
may sometimes be in tension, but they can coexist and accom-
modate each other’s perspectives.256
Leaving final authority with sentencing judges would be 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).  
 250. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 
951, 992–95 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 
89 VA. L. REV. 311, 350–53 (2003). 
 251. See Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 749 (2010) 
(discussing differences between plea and petit juries); Bibas & Bierschbach, 
supra note 233, at 141–44 (discussing plea and sentencing juries).  
 252. See Hoffman, supra note 250, at 1008–09 (discussing use of judicial 
review as a safeguard against excessive jury sentences); Iontcheva, supra note 
250, at 373–76 (same). 
 253. See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Proce-
dure in Comparison with American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 243 (1970). 
 254. See, e.g., BIBAS, supra note 22, at 121–22 (lamenting this phenome-
non). 
 255. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 256. See Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1594 (“In 
the administration of crime policy, as in other government activities, expertise 
has become essential, yet justice officials must also come to terms with public 
input.”). 
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less radical, and we favor that approach. The critical point is 
that whoever the sentencers are, they must digest and reflect 
upon the comments submitted. Having to respond to comments 
and justify sentences publicly would not only discipline 
sentencers, but also legitimate their decisions.257 So, for exam-
ple, sentencers would have to justify why they treated seeming-
ly like cases unalike, distinguishing the current case from the 
typical case meriting the median guideline sentence.258 They 
would have to explain why they chose not to use obvious alter-
natives such as civil remedies, non-prosecution agreements, 
probation, drug treatment, and other less-costly alternatives to 
prison.259 (In theory, federal judges are supposed to explain why 
their proposed sentences are “sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to” serve the various goals of punishment.260 But, 
unchallenged by third parties and able to impose guideline sen-
tences with scant explanation, courts feel little pressure to ap-
ply this principle of parsimony.) And, as in administrative law, 
sentencers would have to respond to other major comments.261 
Sentencers would not have to devote equal time to every com-
ment, but they would have to heed clusters of comments, recur-
ring themes, and individual comments offering significant in-
formation or argument.262
As in administrative law, the emphasis on reasoned deci-
sions situated within a fuller public record would enhance ap-
pellate review.
 They would issue public reasoned 
decisions, which both justified the sentence and announced 
precedents that could develop sentencing law and guide future 
cases. These evolving lines of precedent would articulate and 
weigh the competing values at sentencing. 
263
                                                                                 
 257. See supra notes 
 To check defendants’ tendencies to collude 
with prosecutors and waive their appeals even when it is not in 
their interest, it might be necessary to allow sua sponte review 
or enable probation officers or others close to a case to chal-
lenge sentences. A broader appellate process could even allow 
aggrieved stakeholders to challenge sentences, checking possi-
126–131 and accompanying text. 
 258. See LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB, 357 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 259. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 34, 46–51 (1983). 
 260. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 261. See Conn. Light & Power, Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 
1982). 
 262. See id. 
 263. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health 
Admin., 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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ble abuses. That would include not only victims but also de-
fendants’ families, public defender groups, sentencing think 
tanks, and community members.264 One could establish thresh-
olds for intervention on appeal or loosen rules of standing to let 
these actors challenge final sentences on direct appeal.265
Again, appellate courts could use a sort of hard-look review 
to reverse sentences that were arbitrary and capricious in light 
of the entire record. Factors that might trigger concern include 
a thin evidentiary record; a perfunctory or generic explanation; 
an extremely harsh or lenient sentence compared to similar 
cases; and a failure to consider obvious alternatives, particular-
ly when imposing a novel sentence.
 
266 The reviewing court 
would consider the entire process and reasons given, probing to 
ensure a reasoned connection between the facts, arguments, 
and policies (whether laid out in guidelines or developed ad 
hoc) below and the final sentencing determination. It would 
not, however, substitute its own value judgments or punish-
ment policy.267 Where the explanation or record support was de-
ficient, the court would vacate the sentence and remand for re-
consideration.268 Careful appellate review of this sort could 
police sentences for fairness, consistency, and discrimination 
while still allowing sentencers to develop sentencing policy to 
reflect local values and concerns.269
The goal here is not to create a welter of substantive rights 
that could breed complexity and endless collateral litigation. 
That is a legitimate concern but a manageable one. The aim is 
simply to create procedural avenues that give stakeholders 
voice and help to channel and influence exercises of discretion. 
One can hope that, in the longer term, the lessons learned from 
public comment and responses would create feedback loops. In 
the end, these reforms might help judges, juries, parties, and 
  
                                                                                 
 264. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (allowing any “person . . . adversely affected 
or aggrieved” within the meaning of an agency’s organic statute to seek judi-
cial review of agency action); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. Inc., v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970) (liberally interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 702’s “ad-
versely affected or aggrieved” language). 
 265. See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 266. See Chanenson, supra note 214, at 178–82; Michael M. O’Hear, Appel-
late Review of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2123, 2163 (2010). 
 267. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983). 
 268. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).  
 269. See id. 
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commenters to appreciate one another’s perspectives even if 
they respectfully disagree. 
D. AN EXAMPLE: THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATION 
This notice-and-comment framework could ameliorate 
some of the most contentious issues within criminal justice. 
Take, for example, the problem of witnesses who cooperate with 
the prosecution. Cooperating witnesses can earn large sentence 
discounts for assisting police with undercover investigations 
(by, for example, recording conversations and passing along in-
formation) or for testifying against their former accomplices.270 
The practice, however, is quite controversial. On the one hand, 
criminal organizations are often hierarchical. So, for instance, 
only low-level couriers and street-corner dealers can be caught 
red-handed smuggling or selling drugs. A code of silence and 
fear prevails, making low-level dealers unwilling to rat out 
their bosses and so insulating the high-level wrongdoers from 
prosecution. The same is true of other organized-crime syndi-
cates and gangs. Cooperation rewards help police and prosecu-
tors to flip the small fry to incriminate the middlemen and 
work up the chain to catch the big fish.271
The threat of stiff penalties, coupled with the lure of large 
cooperation discounts, allows prosecutors to crack organiza-
tions and make cases that they could not otherwise have 
made.
  
272 Ringleaders, the most culpable wrongdoers, no longer 
enjoy impunity but face their just deserts. That not only pro-
motes retribution and expressive condemnation, but also in-
creases deterrence by making detection and conviction more 
likely.273
                                                                                 
 270. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punish-
ment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2003). 
 And it sows fear within organizations about potential 
cooperators, potentially raising the cost of running a criminal 
 271. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 
1328–29 (2003). 
 272. Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs and Benefits of 
Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 294 (1996) 
(“Sentencing discounts to cooperators may thus be the only way to get critical 
testimony in a large class of cases worth prosecuting.”); see also Ronald S. Saf-
er & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures: Valuable Tool or 
Dangerous Weapon?, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 41, 42, 44 (1999) (offering example 
in which the threat of mandatory federal drug sentences, coupled with the 
prospect of cooperation discounts, outweighed gang members’ fears about the 
risks of cooperating). 
 273. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
903, 920–24 (2010); Richman, supra note 272, at 293.  
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conspiracy.274
Cooperation discounts, however, have their dark side. They 
encourage snitching and disloyalty even to friends and family, 
about which our society is deeply ambivalent.
 
275 They endanger 
horizontal equity, treating similarly culpable defendants differ-
ently.276 They threaten vertical equity, if more-culpable defend-
ants have more information to trade and succeed in trading it 
for lower sentences.277 They may undercut general deterrence, 
encouraging conspirators to think they can cop pleas and get off 
easily.278 Prosecutors may overbuy testimony and offer overly 
generous discounts out of risk aversion, investigative laziness, 
or a desire to undercut excessive sentences.279 Because prosecu-
tors’ consent is a prerequisite to federal cooperation discounts, 
there may be little oversight or explanation to check these deci-
sions.280 Cooperation discounts also risk encouraging perjury 
from overeager cooperators.281
                                                                                 
 274. See Katyal, supra note 271, at 1334, 1340–43; Daryl J. Levinson, Col-
lective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 398–400 (2003). But cf. Baer, supra 
note 
 And they risk putting a premium 
273, at 925–26 (noting some circumstances in which cooperation benefits 
may encourage socially deleterious behavior such as more price competition 
among fragmented narcotics cartels and more threats of violence to maintain 
group cohesion). 
 275. See Richman, supra note 272, at 293; see also Interview: Clarence Aa-
ron, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ 
snitch/cases/aaron.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of a 
defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friends and cousin); Interview: 
Joey Settembrino, FRONTLINE: SNITCH, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/snitch/cases/joey.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (recounting example of 
a defendant convicted based on cooperation by his friend). 
 276. See Richman, supra note 272, at 292.  
 277. See id. But see Linda Drazga Maxfield & John H. Kramer, Substantial 
Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current Federal Policy 
and Practice, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 11 (1998) (finding that data did not sup-
port perception that more-culpable conspirators were more likely to receive 
discounts). 
 278. See Baer, supra note 273, at 907, 944; Richman, supra note 272, at 
293. 
 279. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old 
Prosecutor ’s Meditation on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer 
Report, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 48–49 (1999); Richman, supra note 272, at 
292–94. 
 280. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (requiring prosecutorial substantial-
assistance motion as prerequisite for imposing sentencing below statutory 
mandatory minimum); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2011) 
(authorizing judges to offer substantial-assistance discounts upon motion of 
the prosecutor).  
 281. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experi-
ences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 952 
(1999). 
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on defense counsel’s experience, connections, and willingness to 
cooperate.282
Scholars often view cooperation discounts as binary, a 
choice between trusting prosecutors and trusting judges to ra-
tion appropriate discounts.
 
283 But a range of inputs at both the 
wholesale and retail levels could illuminate the range of com-
peting values at stake. Notice and comment could chill prosecu-
torial overbuying and excesses of pressure to cooperate. (Recall, 
for instance, the public criticism of Kenneth Starr for pressur-
ing Monica Lewinsky to cooperate by subpoenaing her mother 
to testify before a grand jury.284
In responding to comments, prosecutors and others would 
help to build records explaining and justifying their sentences. 
Prosecutors and sentencing commissions would both adopt 
wholesale policies to structure the cooperation process and jus-
tify retail sentencing recommendations in individual cases.
) Public commentary could also 
call attention to suspected perjury and to discounts that 
threaten vertical and horizontal sentencing equity. 
285
This process would improve particular sentences, but it 
would also help to create a positive feedback loop. Knowing 
that they would be held publicly accountable at the end of the 
 
At both levels, they would explain when there are no alterna-
tives to cooperation; how cooperators are chosen; and why spec-
ified discounts are reasonable and proportional to the amount 
of assistance given. They would also demonstrate why, on bal-
ance, discounts in certain circumstances increase overall deter-
rence by removing ringleaders’ impunity. And they would help 
to justify prosecutorial priorities, explaining why the costs of 
cooperation are worth it for certain types of cases and flagging 
or fleshing out guidelines for cooperation in the process. If 
properly justified, these sentences would seem more equitable, 
commensurate with the assistance given, the risks taken, and 
the remorse manifested by cooperators. 
                                                                                 
 282. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2485–86. 
 283. See, e.g., Richman, supra note 272, at 294 (framing this choice as a di-
chotomy and favoring prosecutorial power because prosecutors are better 
placed to discern deception). 
 284. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Testing of a President: The Mother; Mother ’s Le-
gal Vulnerability is Seen as Motive for Lewinsky, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at 
A16. 
 285. At least some prosecutors’ offices, such as U.S. Attorneys’ offices, al-
ready have such policies, although they are formulated behind closed doors 
and not made public. See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 
Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. 
REV. 105, 125–30 (1994). 
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process, police and prosecutors would be more careful about 
their investigative, charging, and plea-bargaining decisions 
earlier on. They would exhaust alternative investigative tech-
niques before resorting to cooperation. They would take more 
care to sign up the least culpable cooperators, compensating for 
the natural tendency to favor defendants who have familiar, 
well-connected defense lawyers.286
IV.  OBJECTIONS   
 And they would better ration 
their use of cooperating witnesses, reducing the systemic costs 
of sentencing inequity and perceived unfairness. Opening sen-
tencing to an array of viewpoints would not only increase 
transparency and reasoned justifications, but in the long run 
would also improve this shadowy corner of criminal justice.  
We recognize that our participatory sentencing framework 
brings with it its own set of concerns. One obvious objection is 
that it is unnecessary: one might think that elections of local 
prosecutors already provide a much more direct way of cabining 
discretion, injecting public input into prosecutorial policymak-
ing, and ensuring legitimacy and accountability to boot. Ronald 
Wright, however, has shown that elections deliver far less than 
they promise.287 Re-election rates are greater than 95%, with 
about 85% of sitting district attorneys running unopposed.288 
Even those who face challengers “do not face much meaningful 
public scrutiny of their policies or priorities.”289 Instead, Wright 
shows, “elections turn on generic claims about ‘competence,’ 
familiar but unhelpful measures (‘conviction rate’), and—most 
common of all—claims about high profile cases (both successes 
and failures). Election rhetoric does not highlight ideological or 
policy differences.”290 And even if it did, elections do not elicit 
the same granularity of input on specific policies or the same 
diversity of viewpoints from affected communities.291
                                                                                 
 286. See Bibas, supra note 
 As Erik 
Luna explains, some of the groups most affected by real-world 
sentencing policies—such as poor, urban, inner-city communi-
ties—have no real voice at the ballot box, leaving them with no 
5, at 2485–86. 
 287. Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 581 (2009). 
 288. See id. at 592–93 (stating re-election statistics).  
 289. Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1606. 
 290. Id. (summarizing findings and conclusions in Wright, How Prosecutor 
Elections Fail Us, supra note 287). 
 291. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 359, 389–90 (2005). 
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effective remedy to or input into policymaking at the electoral 
level.292 Notice and comment could bypass some of these pathol-
ogies, encouraging prosecutors to pay more attention to a wider 
array of voices and information brought to bear on particular 
policies or decisions.293
Of course, for notice and comment to deliver on that prom-
ise, those voices must in fact materialize. A related concern 
thus has to do with who participates. After all, one way of fram-
ing the problem with American criminal justice today is that 
we have too much public participation, not too little. The broad 
and deep codes that give prosecutors their power are the result 
of a lopsided politics in which the “voices in favor of broader 
laws and longer punishments are powerful” and those opposed 
are weak.
 
294 Critics might worry that a similar dynamic will in-
fect the process we propose. They might fear that victims’ 
rights groups, prison guard unions, and other organized tough-
on-crime interests would dominate the comment process, fur-
ther skewing sentences toward even harsher punishments.295 
Interest representation in administrative law has in fact been 
criticized on just these grounds.296
But by formalizing and regularizing the voices that go into 
sentencing, notice and comment likely would yield more bal-
anced interest representation on sentencing issues than cur-
rently exists. The lesson of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
was not that tough-on-crime interests always drown out all 
others. It was that, for interest representation to work in sen-
  
                                                                                 
 292. See Luna, supra note 163, at 589. 
 293. See id. at 587–90; Stewart, supra note 79, at 1775–76; Sunstein, supra 
note 245, at 105–06. 
 294. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 6, at 1030; see also Stuntz, 
supra note 143, at 546–52. 
 295. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 6, at 912 (noting that 
“the problem with making prosecutorial decisions more transparent is that the 
politics of crime might push them in a decidedly antidefendant direction”); 
Wright, supra note 169, at 1013; see also Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of 
Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 52–58 (2010); Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 720 n.82 (2005) (not-
ing that California’s prison guard union “poured money into the campaign for 
the anti-recidivist statute”). 
 296. See Croley, supra note 90, at 58–60; Kagan, supra note 83, at 2266 
(noting criticisms that the efforts made to ensure broad interest representa-
tion in administrative law “had left in place, or perhaps even aggravated, sub-
stantial disparities in interest group influence”); Stewart, supra note 79, at 
1670; see also William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regu-
latory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 
1351, 1356 (1997) (criticizing negotiated rulemaking on the ground that it “es-
tablish[es] privately bargained interests as the source of putative public law”). 
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tencing, procedural mechanisms must exist to make participa-
tion meaningful. Most organized interest groups probably 
would participate in formulating wholesale policies, as well as 
in high-profile cases or those raising wholesale-level policy is-
sues.297 Where they do, public defender groups, sentencing-
reform organizations, and other pro-defendant groups would 
have the incentives and ability to participate along with every-
one else, as they sought to do with the Federal Guidelines.298 
The experiences of some state guidelines commissions, as well 
as those of localities like Kitsap County, show that open, inclu-
sive processes can be far more balanced than legislatures or the 
Federal Sentencing Commission.299
The dynamic would be similar in more run-of-the-mill cas-
es, in which victims, defendants’ friends and families, and oth-
ers often already submit information or arguments in a variety 
of ways.
 Notice and comment could 
thus help force on-the-ground sentencing policymakers to take 
seriously voices that get little traction at the legislative level.  
300 A comment period would flush these views into the 
open and put them on equal footing. True, in any given case 
some risk will always exist that one side’s comments might 
overwhelm the others. But sheer volume matters less than sub-
stance in the comment process. Moreover, the judge as 
sentencer would retain the authority to disregard hysterical, 
hateful, or other comments, as agencies disregard irrelevant or 
extreme comments in rulemakings.301 As we have argued else-
where, victims and individual citizens are far less vengeful 
than we usually assume. They care not only about substantive 
outcomes, but also about being listened to and taken seriously. 
Particularly if they have their day in court, they will not auto-
matically demand the maximum punishment.302
                                                                                 
 297. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: 
THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 173 (2003) (discussing inter-
est-group participation in high-profile criminal law policy issues); Wright & 
Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 
 And in all cas-
es, prosecutors and judges would consider comments against 
background sentencing principles that aim to ferret out bias, 
6, at 1594 (discussing public input 
into local criminal justice policy debates). 
 298. Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 147, at 1643. 
 299. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State 
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 443–44 (2000). 
 300. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
 302. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 233, at 137–39; see also BIBAS, 
supra note 21, at 36–40, 91. 
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inequality, and the like. By flushing into the open the policy 
tradeoffs that drive prosecutorial charging, bargaining, and 
sentencing decisions, notice and comment may guard against 
such concerns.303
Making prosecutorial policies more open and accessible 
carries its own risks. Some readers might worry that disclosure 
of guidelines or decisional criteria will undermine deterrence by 
bridging the criminal law’s acoustic separation and sending 
signals that some crimes are freebies.
 
304 That worry is over-
blown, for several reasons. First, disclosure of prosecutorial pol-
icies does not mean the creation of binding enforcement or 
charging thresholds. Prosecutors always could exercise their 
reasoned discretion to pursue a given case as they see fit, and 
some low-level arrest and declination decisions would still im-
plicate resource-allocation issues largely off limits to comment 
and review. Second, the limited evidence is that even jurisdic-
tions that have disclosed declination and charging policies have 
not seen an increase in low-level crimes.305 That may be in part 
because deterrence is at least as much normative as it is coer-
cive,306 and in part because for those repeat offenders who are 
most likely to offend again, disclosure only confirms what they 
already know.307 Third, to the extent that deterrence is coercive, 
it is the certainty and not the severity of punishment that mat-
ters most.308
                                                                                 
 303. See Mendelson, supra note 
 For more serious cases in which the only issue is 
93, at 441 (arguing that a right to petition 
for notice and comment for regulatory guidances could “prompt agencies to 
identify more significant and controversial policies earlier, as well as to use a 
more thorough, participatory process for these policies”). 
 304. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 669 (1984); see also Ed-
ward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 686 (2006) (“Ordinarily, enforcement strategies are closely 
guarded secrets, since disclosure undermines their efficacy and deterrence 
value.”); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. 
L. REV. 407, 452 (2008). 
 305. See Wright & Miller, Accountability Deficit, supra note 6, at 1615–17 
(discussing Kitsap County). For examples of published prosecutorial policies, 
see Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48 (1975) and Mario Merola, Modern Pros-
ecutorial Techniques, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 237–40, 251–58 (1980) (publish-
ing some details of Bronx County District Attorney’s Office’s internal screen-
ing and plea-bargaining procedures). 
 306. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 591, 603–04 (1996).  
 307. See O’Hear, supra note 304, at 452. 
 308. See Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. 
INQUIRY 297, 307–08 (1991); Ann Dryden White, Estimating the Economic 
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what and not whether to charge, the impact of disclosure on 
law enforcement goals will thus be less of an issue. Finally, giv-
en the low risks of apprehension and offenders’ over-optimism 
about their own risk of getting caught, deterrence is speculative 
even without more disclosure. If disclosure teaches offenders 
anything new, the benefits might equal or outweigh the costs 
by bolstering the message that certain serious crimes are at the 
top of prosecutors’ lists.309
Finally, there are issues of cost and feasibility. Notice-and-
comment sentencing will take time and money, and the volume 
of cases to which it could potentially apply is huge. While these 
concerns are real, they are also manageable. While we believe 
many lessons can be learned from administrative law’s ap-
proach to participation, we do not recommend all of its cumber-
some statutory and judicial strictures. Reforms need not hap-
pen all at once, and courts, legislators, and prosecutors’ offices 
should experiment with what works best. At the wholesale lev-
el, the most formal procedures—those most closely akin to true 
notice and comment in the administrative agency context—
might be reserved for statewide sentencing commissions, guide-
lines from state attorneys general, and other significant bod-
ies.
  
310 Counties and local governments might start out by adopt-
ing less formal approaches bearing more resemblance to 
negotiated rulemaking, such as town meetings or transparent 
working groups comprising representatives of various inter-
ests.311
                                                                                                                                                                             
Model of Crime with Individual Data, 94 Q.J. ECON. 57, 79 (1980). 
 In retail cases, notice and comment could be restricted 
 309. O’Hear, supra note 304, at 452. 
 310. Cf. Memorandum from Rob Portman, supra note 120, at 15–18 (dis-
cussing when both traditional notice-and-comment procedures and less formal 
alternatives might be appropriate for “significant” agency guidance docu-
ments). 
 311. As administrative law scholars recognize, negotiated rulemaking and 
other informal processes tend to work best for rules that affect a relatively 
small number of interests or manageable communities. Formal notice and 
comment, by contrast, is better suited for rules that have significant effects on 
many interests across a broad political community. See, e.g., PIERCE ET AL., 
supra note 102, § 6.4.6f; see also Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The 
Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 
1318–19 (1997) (noting in an empirical study of negotiated rulemaking that 
“the EPA recommends formal negotiation only when the parties are ‘reasona-
bly few in number,’” and that “the EPA rules that affect the broadest number 
of organizations have never been selected for negotiated rulemaking” (citation 
omitted)); Philip Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 30, 46 (1982) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking “can reduce the time 
and cost of developing regulations,” but that “negotiation would not work” 
where “even several individuals could not represent the interests” of all of the 
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to the most serious and heinous crimes, such as death-penalty 
cases, terrorism cases, or widespread financial frauds. Or laws 
could pick out contentious categories of cases, such as domestic 
abuse, drunk driving, or victimless crimes, to throw competing 
viewpoints into sharp relief. Alternatively, notice and comment 
could be limited to cases raising significant issues that bear on 
the public’s interest in the administration of criminal justice, 
such as the use of informants.312 Judges could be given the au-
thority to order notice and comment in individual cases they 
find to meet that standard. Or the parties, probation officers, or 
even members of the public could be allowed to petition for no-
tice and comment under the same criteria, with rules prohibit-
ing pro forma or abusive petitions and judges having the final 
say.313
Similar issues will need to be worked out as to how best to 
notify members of the public and encourage the submission of 
comments by a representative cross-section of the community, 
especially at the retail level. One possibility would be to post 
“Notices of Proposed Sentencing” on courthouse websites, with 
links to critical record information and a comment form.
 Drawing these lines will not be easy, but neither will it 
be impossible. 
314
                                                                                                                                                                             
industrial or other sectors affected by a rule); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing 
Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 437 n.109 (arguing that “for ne-
gotiated rulemaking to be effective, the number of affected interests must be 
relatively small (less than 20–25) and the interests of the parties should be 
those that they are willing to trade off and compromise”). In small jurisdic-
tions in which on-the-ground policymakers are already plugged into local con-
cerns from a cross-section of the community—think, for instance, of a rural 
jurisdiction in which the local prosecutor, judge, police, defense attorney, and 
townsfolk generally know one another—much of what we propose might al-
ready be occurring informally one way or another, making the case for reform 
less pressing. 
 This 
likely would go some distance toward fostering involvement by 
well-organized interest groups and those with easy Internet ac-
cess. But its usefulness for drawing in more dispersed or less 
 312. Cf. Mendelson, supra note 93, at 444–45 (discussing feasibility of 
providing notice and comment for “significant” regulatory guidances). 
 313. Cf. id. at 439–44 (discussing feasibility of allowing citizens to petition 
for notice and comment for regulatory guidances when certain criteria are sat-
isfied). 
 314. See, e.g., Farina et al., 140 Characters or Less, supra note 235, at 390–
91 (describing one approach for translating a traditional Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking to a digestible set of “Issue Posts” for use in soliciting comments 
on the Internet); Peter M. Shane, Empowering the Collaborative Citizen in the 
Administrative State: A Case Study of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 483, 498–500 (2011) (reviewing Internet-based tools 
for broadening the range of public input in FCC rulemakings). 
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advantaged members of the public is less clear, particularly in 
garden-variety retail cases in which public interest groups are 
unlikely to be effective stand-ins.315 Perhaps probation officers 
could collect brief comment sheets in advance as part of their 
presentence investigations. They could also do more to reach 
indirect victims, neighbors, and families of defendants, as well 
as neighborhood watch groups, churches, parent-teacher asso-
ciations, and the like.316 Or perhaps standing, advisory sentenc-
ing juries could be empaneled, much like grand juries currently 
sit, to help elicit factual information and inject more views into 
the process.317 Admittedly, the further into retail sentencing our 
proposal goes, and the further up the rungs of the retail ladder 
one climbs, the more difficult the questions become. But the 
fact that there are not easy answers here should not obscure 
the point that there are questions worth asking. Without tak-
ing seriously the public’s voice in the public interest, we cannot 
even begin the conversation.318
  CONCLUSION   
  
Criminal and administrative law both grapple with how to 
                                                                                 
 315. See Farina et al., Rulemaking 2.0, supra note 235, at 396–414 (de-
scribing results of two case studies that used a combination of traditional and 
Internet-based approaches to attempt to increase outreach to and participa-
tion of stakeholders in rulemaking, and reporting mixed success). 
 316. Here too, the use of social media, including social networking sites like 
Facebook, and other Internet-based strategies, might expedite such outreach, 
although more research still needs to be done on how effectively to use such 
tools. See generally id. (surveying current issues in agency rulemaking con-
text). For recent examples of the burgeoning literature on this subject, see 
Cliff Lampe et al., Motivations to Participate in Online Communities, PROC. 
28TH INT’L CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1927 (2010), available 
at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753616, and Jennifer Preece & Ben 
Shneiderman, The Reader-To-Leader Framework: Motivating Technology-
Mediated Social Participation, 1 AIS TRANSACTIONS ON HUM.-COMPUTER IN-
TERACTION 13 (2009), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/thci/vol1/iss1/5/. 
 317. See, e.g., Iontcheva, supra note 250, at 373–76 (2003) (discussing dif-
ferent models of judge-jury interaction at sentencing); see also United States v. 
Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 219, 226–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing potential 
use of advisory juries by courts).  
 318. Readers generally skeptical of the value of participation in adminis-
trative law will be skeptical of our proposals as well. Whether participation 
has any place in administrative law generally is a much larger question that 
we do not take on here. Our point is more limited: rightly or wrongly, adminis-
trative law is premised on the virtues of participation as a response to some of 
the pathologies of the administrative state. Those same pathologies infect 
criminal sentencing. It is thus worth thinking seriously about how that same 
framework maps onto criminal justice, and onto real-world sentencing in par-
ticular. 
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justify, channel, and legitimize professionals’ exercise of state 
power. Yet the two fields have developed in almost complete 
isolation from each other. Administrative law procedures elicit 
the public’s information and value preferences, helping to blend 
public input and expertise in giving meaning to vague terms 
such as the public interest. Notice-and-comment procedures 
thus constrain agency discretion and promote better outcomes. 
But they also legitimize agency actions taken publicly after 
heeding the public’s voices. While experts remain in charge, 
they must reflect upon public input and justify their exercises 
of discretion. 
Criminal procedure could likewise benefit from explicitly 
blending expert and lay perspectives. That does not mean im-
porting all the slowness and rigidity of administrative rulemak-
ing. Nor does it mean relying primarily on external controls 
such as judicial review. But it does suggest that internal poli-
cies, checked by judicial review and public oversight, could do 
much more to incorporate public input and promote clear, con-
sistent justice. Although considerations of cost and volume 
must limit the extent of retail reforms, criminal justice need 
not remain a lawless anomaly. Few substantive standards 
guide the decisions by which prosecutors and others shape 
charges and sentences. We can do more to check professionals’ 
faithfulness in exercising discretion. 
One could extend this Article’s ideas to other domains of 
criminal justice, especially at the back end. One possibility is to 
apply notice and comment to parole. To the public, parole risks 
seeming like haphazard leniency that undercuts deserved pun-
ishment. Existing parole guidelines are flawed because they 
were created without public notice or comment, so they do little 
to justify parole or respond to legitimate public concerns.319
                                                                                 
 319. See, e.g., NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW & POLICY 
821 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that “usually . . . [parole] guidelines have been issued 
by the parole board itself,” with little legislative or other oversight); ASS’N OF 
PAROLING AUTHS. INT’L, PAROLE BOARD SURVEY 2003, at 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.apaintl.org/documents/surveys/2003.pdf (finding in a survey of fif-
ty-two parole boards, including those of forty-four states and several territo-
ries, that more than half did not use any formal set of written guidelines or 
assessment instruments in making release decisions); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law 
Incarcerated, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 329 app. at 376 (2009) (detailing ex-
emptions from state notice-and-comment laws for rules related to prisoners 
and prison conditions, including rules governing parole). 
 
Public, transparent, and participatory parole guidelines, 
pegged to dangerousness, rehabilitation, illness, old age, and 
the like, could both improve decisions and better explain them 
  
70 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1 
 
to the public.320 Likewise, executive clemency seems like arbi-
trary favoritism for well-connected convicts, or else gubernato-
rial softness on crime.321 Thus, pardons and sentence commuta-
tions have all but died out in many states.322
                                                                                 
 320. The factors governing parole release decisions are broad and varied. 
They include things like the offender’s participation in prison programs; in-
fractions of prison rules; job opportunities upon release; family ties; the seri-
ousness of the original offense; expressions of remorse and repentance; the 
risk of recidivism; and the views of victims, community members, prosecutors, 
or sentencing judges. See, e.g., PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE 
PRISONS 4–14 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=
pbdetail&iid=820 (describing how state boards approach parole decisions and 
listing factors that shape those decisions); see also Miller v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (App. Div. 2010) (noting the parole board’s con-
sideration of “the petitioner’s institutional record, including his disciplinary 
record, program accomplishments, academic achievements, and post-release 
living arrangements, as well as the violent circumstances of his crime, his 
criminal history, and his continued claim of innocence” in making its release 
decision (citations omitted)). Today, as a practical matter, dangerousness and 
other public safety factors top the list. See Joshua Stengel, Parole’s Function, 
Purpose, and Role in the Criminal Justice System, NAT’L INST. CORRECTIONS 
(Aug. 30, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://community.nicic.gov/blogs/parole/archive/
2010/08/30/parole-s-function-purpose-and-role-in-the-criminal-justice-
system.aspx (describing how risk assessment and public safety concerns have 
begun to dominate release decisions). 
 Clemency 
guidelines could structure consideration of remorse, apology, 
reform, and prospects for a law-abiding life. In both instances, 
public input at the wholesale level could help in working 
through messy and difficult normative questions—what sorts of 
release risks are worth taking, for what types of offenders do 
the costs of continued imprisonment overwhelm the benefits, 
what factors should matter most for the community’s for-
 321. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State 
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1345–51 (2008) (connecting 
declines in clemency and pardon rates both to concerns about unreviewable, 
arbitrary, and capricious exercises of executive discretion and to tough-on-
crime politics). 
 322. See Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/actions_administration
.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (documenting steady decrease in presidential 
grants of clemency petitions from 36% under President Nixon to 1.8% under 
President George W. Bush); Eric R. Johnson, Doe v. Nelson: The Wrongful As-
sumption of Gubernatorial Plenary Authority over the Pardoning Process, 50 
S.D. L. REV. 156, 179 (2005) (observing that “[a] similar downward trend” to 
the one at the federal level “can be found at the state level”); Daniel T. Kobil, 
Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, 
AND CLEMENCY 36, 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (citing a 
survey of commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found that “most states aver-
aged fewer than one hundred commutations per state, with thirty-four states . 
. . having dispensed twenty or fewer”). 
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giveness, and so forth.323 Retail-level input, say by parole or 
even clemency juries in the most important cases, could provide 
further political cover for risk-averse governors to grant mercy 
in the right cases.324
Practical challenges remain. Criminal justice agencies, like 
other agencies, must experiment with identifying and including 
representative samples of the public and managing issues of 
cost and confidentiality. They must foster thoughtful dialogue 
between expert and lay voices, modulating knee-jerk assump-
tions and responses. But these practical challenges should not 
halt reform. Ultimately, we must strive to make criminal jus-
tice transparent and participatory enough to serve the public 
interest and to earn the public’s confidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 
 323. As David Ball notes, these and similar questions raised by parole are 
especially amendable to some form of public input, which could help “deter-
mine whether releasing an individual would be ‘worth it,’ with all the vague, 
value- and policy-laden implications that phrase entails.” W. David Ball, Nor-
mative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 395, 408 (2011). The 
same holds true for clemency, at least insofar as it should serve the public’s 
and not the executive’s purely private or political interests. Whether an execu-
tive’s application of clemency guidelines should be subject to any sort of expla-
nation or judicial review requirements is a separate question. For an argu-
ment that they should not be, see Barkow, supra note 321, at 1358–65. 
 324. Cf. Ball, supra note 323, at 407–10 (proposing an increased role for 
juries in parole decision-making as a way of injecting community values into 
parole release decisions); Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) Ameri-
can “Revolution in Punishment Theory,” 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2010–
2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons’ sense of justice to 
parole release decisions). 
